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ABSTRACT 
Fire suppression and rescue is the primary mission of the fire service, but not all rescue 
efforts entail putting out fires.  For this reason, the fire service created special operations 
teams.  Special operations teams are comprised of highly trained members with advanced 
skills that come at a high cost to fund and operate.  Using three Dallas Fire-Rescue 
special operations teams as case studies, the findings presented are:  (1) benefits and 
priorities of developing subject matter experts; (2) feasibility from the fire service 
standpoint and practicality of special operations teams in the fire service; (3) special 
operations teams can complement or support other special operations teams; and (4) the 
framework for Dallas Fire-Rescue special operations teams is flexible enough for many 
fire departments to utilize.  The conclusion and recommendations of this analysis will 
challenge fire service tradition.  The value innovation of rank-specific organizational 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Priorities for the fire service always have been and will continue to be fire 
suppression and rescue.  While rescue is the primary mission of the fire service, not all 
rescue efforts entail putting out fires.  For this reason, the fire service created special 
operations teams (Norman, 2009, p. 9).  Specialized teams of firefighters have been 
trained and organized within the fire service to respond to high-risk but low-frequency 
events.  Special operations (special ops) teams may or may not respond to fires.  A good 
way to define a special ops team is as any operation other than basic fire suppression that 
requires specialized training in unique topics such as:   
 Urban search and rescue (US&R) 
 Hazardous materials response team (HMRT) 
 Swiftwater rescue 
 Dive rescue team  
 Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
 Wildland firefighting 
 Aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) (Norman, 2009) 
These teams are often developed and organized when deficiencies are recognized 
in after action review incident reports of incidents that involved loss of lives. 
Special operations teams come at a high cost to fund and operate.  The vast 
majority of fire departments do not generate revenue for the entities they serve; instead, 
they are dependent upon tax dollars.  Therefore, the cost of special operations teams 
added to the fire service budget increases the cost of the overall operating budget.  The 
demand for changes in fire service response is driven by life-safety measures for the 
community.  Start-up funding can usually be acquired for the development and 
implementation of special operations teams due to the loss of life, but sustained funding 
for the teams is relatively nonexistent.  Even when the need has been determined and 
funding established for special operations teams, staffing becomes another issue.  
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Staffing these teams with specially trained and certified personnel can be challenging due 
to promotions within the fire service.  The fire service is a paramilitary organization, 
which means personnel can only be assigned to a position equal to the rank they hold.  
This can limit the number of certified and trained personnel available for vacant positions 
until more people meet the rank qualification and are certified. 
Failure to fund special ops lowers the fire service’s life-safety standards for 
protection within communities.  For example, during severe weather events, such as if the 
roof of a building collapses due to a torrential rainstorm causing flash flooding and 
trapping victims, basic fire suppression trained responders will be unequipped to 
effectively rescue victims and further protect the community.  This type of incident 
requires special operations teams like US&R and Swiftwater Rescue. 
The equipment used by special teams is just that, specialized tools, instruments, 
machines, monitors, etc.  Special operations personnel and staff must spend extra time 
consistently training and extensively using this equipment to stay proficient within their 
specialized discipline.  This equipment is costly but required by the special teams to carry 
out the rescue missions to which they are responding or deployed. 
During hard economic times, government officials prioritize public as well as 
public safety services (Dallas, 2010).  When tough budgetary decisions have to be made, 
government officials may revert to a pre-9/11 mind-set that the job of the fire service is 
just to put out fires.  People who think of the fire service as only putting out fires may see 
no need for special operations teams.  The result often becomes an identifiable pattern of 
decreased funding for special operations teams, or, worse, they may be placed out-of-
service.  Reverting back to just putting out fires and ignoring the possibility of a 
catastrophic event is an attitude that displays an obvious disregard for fire service life-
safety standards within the community.  Identifying and understanding the psychological 
implications, ethics, and politics of a disaster that are not factored in fire service budgets 




Research has shown that the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or 
man-made catastrophe can be physically and emotionally damaging to people and their 
communities (Concordia University, 2008).  Catastrophic events will continue to occur at 
unpredictable intervals.  The fire service’s expanded role of deploying special operations 
teams to catastrophes enhances the critical mission of rescue by rapidly positioning assets 
and resources within the communities affected.  The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security states, ―Our first and most solemn obligation is to protect the American people‖ 
(DHS, 2007b, p. 1).  It has become the duty of firefighters as domestic defenders to 
respond and meet the needs of the communities within the homeland much like our 
military defends the homeland abroad.   
Catastrophic events have changed the world, and the fire service has adjusted to 
the changes by maintaining rescue as their number one priority.  More than basic 
firefighting skills are required to successfully rescue people from calamities such as: 
structure collapse, confined space, trench collapse, hazardous materials exposure, water 
or swift water.  Firefighters that staff special operations teams have experience with all 
types of emergencies that allow them to improvise for situations that have no standard 
operating procedures for because these situations tend to be one of a kind.  Fire service 
special operations teams merit further research to determine their importance in the fire 
service, possibilities for achieving sustainment funding, and examining the investment in 
the community’s safety and security.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Could combining special operations in the fire service achieve greater efficiency 
and stronger homeland security and defense? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review identifies issues relevant to fire service special operations.  
This material addresses special operations’ role in the fire service, their capabilities, and 
relevance.  Few sources relate specifically to fire service special operations teams, 
although there is some research available on military special operations forces (SOF).  
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There is relevant material found in federal, state, and local government documents 
relating to strategies, guidelines, or laws, and in articles and research studies. Other 
sources pertinent to analyzing and understanding risks, as well as funding issues to 
consider when deciding to implement special operations teams, were reviewed.  Sub-
literature sources that impact fire service delivery include research on communities’ 
perception of service delivery, psychological effects of catastrophes on the community, 
and the process of federal assistance approval. 
1. Government Guidelines for Response 
There are several government documents that outline homeland security roles of 
first responders’ capabilities regarding preparedness and response, with an emphasis 
placed on lifesaving measures.  These documents give responsibility to first responders as 
they begin laying the groundwork for how the event will be handled.  Under these 
guidelines, the fire service will control the chaos, place resources, and rescue people.  It 
is these mitigation and response actions that will determine the scope, length, and 
operational periods of the catastrophe. 
Completely preventing terrorist attacks and man-made or natural disasters is 
impossible; therefore, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) states that all 
catastrophes are local, meaning they should be handled at the local jurisdiction level as 
much as possible, utilizing local resources such as mutual aid (DHS, 2008b).  During a 
catastrophic event, when local and state emergency resources become overwhelmed and a 
reserve supply of resources is required for continuous emergency response, mitigation, 
and recovery, the state government turns to the federal government for assistance. The 
Stafford Act provides the framework for federal resources to be made available to a state 
requesting emergency assistance in dealing with a catastrophe (Brazan, 2005).  The 
requested emergency resource response will not be immediate.  There will be a time-lag 
between when an emergency declaration is approved, the location of required resources is 
determined, and resources are deployed to the catastrophic location.  It is politicians who 
make the formal request for emergency assistance, not the commander of the operation.  
The 9/11 Commission Report attributes delays in response to bureaucracies, stating, ―It is 
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hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor.  Once the danger has 
fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier—but it then may be too late‖ 
(National Commission on Terrorists Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 
2004, p. 350).  As noted above, local and state government officials will have the primary 
responsibility to continue and manage the emergency response.  According to America at 
Risk: America Burning Recommissioned, the fire service will fulfill this role by being the 
primary responder to all local hazards and closest connection government has to the 
disaster-threatened community (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 
2002). 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security 2007 (NSHS) defines homeland 
security as ―a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover 
from the attacks that do occur.‖ (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2007b, p. 3).  
The NSHS further states that ―it is our collective duty to provide the best response 
possible‖ to any catastrophe (DHS, 2007b, p. 31).  This strategy falls within the 
responsibility of the fire service as first responders to provide the best response possible.  
The best response possible may require special operations teams. 
Local roles and responsibilities can be derived from national strategy Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 which establishes a national policy for federal 
departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and protect it 
from terrorist attacks (DHS, 2003b).  It is the responsibility of the DHS Secretary to 
―identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key 
resources with an emphasis on critical infrastructure and key resources that could be 
exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from 
the use of a weapon of mass destruction‖ (DHS, 2003b, p. 13).  HSPD 7 Number 13 
outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DHS Secretary and implies that the loss of 
human life consequence should be given the highest priority in the risk assessment 
process (Metoeff, 2005, p. 23).  This priority of human life consequence parallels the 
same high ranking position used in fire service risk assessment. 
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2. Public Perception of Service Delivery 
The Essentials of Fire Department Customer Service states that firefighters should 
always consider how their actions are perceived by the community (1996).  Impressions 
are formed instantly according to firefighters’ appearance, performance, and behavior 
(Brunacini).  Communities’ perceptions are developed and maintained by direct or 
indirect experiences that they react from. These perceptions can reflect positively or 
negatively on the overall image of the fire service (Brunacini, 1996, p. 53).  
Miskel claims there is a misconception that the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) is one of the first responders to a catastrophe (2006, p. 7).  Such was the 
case in Hurricane Katrina, when the distribution of tee-shirts and ball caps with the 
FEMA logo were given to first responders to wear (Miskel, 2006, p. 127). When media 
outlets broadcast footage of first responders crawling into collapsed buildings searching 
for survivors, people got the mistaken impression that FEMA personnel were conducting 
search and rescue missions (Miskel p. 128).  This misconception causes confusion with 
local communities questioning why local fire service special operations teams are needed 
if federal teams are available.  In reality federal teams are not available for deployment 
until officially requested through proper procedures and subsequently approved by the 
appropriate authorities.   
Public perceptions concerning fire protection within the community are reinforced 
by the emphasis on suppressing fires through Insurance Services Offices (ISO) ratings.  
Through the ISO Public Protection Classification (PPC) program, communities are 
evaluated and graded on the fire service’s ability to suppress fires (ISO, 2006).  The 
ranges of grades are from a Class 1 (which represents superior fire protection) to a Class 
10 (which indicates that fire protection does not meet ISO minimum criteria) (2006).  
Communities pay attention to these ratings because low ISO ratings translate into lower 
insurance premiums (ISO, 2004).  Fire service special operations teams have advanced 
capabilities to significantly increase live safety and property protection, but unfortunately 
these qualifications are not factored into ISO ratings. 
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3. The Role of Fire Service Special Operations 
Norman refers to the National Fire Protection Association’s Standard on 
Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents (NFPA 1670) to 
describe technical rescue, which is ―The application of special knowledge, skills and 
equipment to resolve unique and/or complex rescue situations‖ (2009, p. 6).  He further 
states that technical rescue involves rescuers operating in a hazardous complex 
environment, using specialized tools or equipment, armed with specialized training skills 
and knowledge in order to achieve a successful outcome (Norman).  The urban 
environment is where most complex incidents happen requiring the need for urban search 
& rescue (US&R) teams to search and find a victim before the rescue of the victim can 
begin (Norman, 2006, p. 5). 
Norman reasons that the fire service should be the primary provider for special 
operations teams because of the two types of incidents encountered: those on fire or 
which have the potential to ignite, and those without a fire threat (2009, p. 4).  The fire 
service has trained people in the basics of rescue and understands that decreasing the time 
a victim is exposed to a life-threatening event by rescuing them, the better chances of 
survival (Norman).  Firefighters train daily on a wide range of subjects such as building 
construction, overhaul of structures, hazardous materials, elevator use, rope and knot-
tying skills, and survival techniques that provide them with a broad basic knowledge base 
(Norman).  It is this basic knowledge foundation of firefighters that specialized rescue 
operations teams can be further trained and established (Norman). 
4. Military Special Operations Forces 
In Norman’s book Fire Department Special Operations, he compares the amount 
of time and effort spent by the fire service and military developing operational plans by 
quoting this military axiom: ―The greatest battle plan in the world is only valuable until 
the first shot is fired, then it is up to the commanders to recognize conditions that are 




emergency response for firefighters is similar to military experiences, in that both deal 
with a changing enemy and the best designed plans may be insufficient to counteract a 
particular situation (Norman, 2009, p. 83). 
Tucker and Lamb identify four items required for military special operations 
forces (SOF) to succeed and that offer parallels for the fire service special operations 
teams:  
The department’s leadership must provide guidance for what the team is to 
accomplish and why; 
The teams’ leadership will decide how to accomplish the objectives;  
The team must have information technology resources, administrative support, 
and members dedicated to the team; 
Members’ performance evaluations results should be determined individually and 
as a group (Tucker & Lamb, 2007, p. 226). 
Effective communication between policymakers and SOF commanders is an 
obstacle according to Tucker and Lamb (2007).  Politicians are policymakers that lack the 
understanding of military special operations (Tucker & Lamb, p. 229).  The government 
bureaucracy between politicians and SOF limits their ability to provide an accurate risk 
assessment of utilizing SOF (Tucker & Lamb, p. 231) The authors reason that utilizing 
SOF must be in line with the importance of the mission set forth by the policymakers, 
―then the goals and restraints of policy must inform operational planning and execution, 
just as the possibilities and problems of operations must inform policy making‖ (Tucker 
& Lamb, p. 231).  Policymakers and SOF commanders must learn to trust and understand 
each other’s viewpoint in decision making. The solution offered by the authors to get past 
communication obstacles is for both parties to participate in realistic scenarios for the 
approval, conduct, and possible consequences of a SOF stated mission (Tucker & Lamb, 
p. 231).  This realistic scenario solution could apply to fire service first responders and 
policymakers within their respective regions.  This will allow policymakers to better 




The military definition of special operations shows similarities and some distinct 
differences with fire service special operations.  The Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (as amended through October 31, 2009) defines special 
operations as (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001): 
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no 
broad conventional force requirement.  These operations often require 
covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are 
applicable across the range of military operations.  They can be conducted 
independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or 
other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or 
by indigenous or surrogate forces.  Special operations differ from 
conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, 
operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly 
support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 
indigenous assets.  (p. 505)   
Clearly, the fire service does not have any military capabilities regarding use of 
force or any reason to conduct covert or clandestine operations.  Norman has a theme 
throughout his book that basically characterizes special operations as personnel dedicated 
to rescuing victims by overcoming challenges and never giving up. (2009). 
5. Psychological Effects of Catastrophe 
Most fire service responses to fire suppression incidents will not require mental 
health crisis intervention services.  Norman addresses the point that when vacant building 
fires are fought from the exterior, there is no need for deployment of a special operations 
rescue team (2009, p. 157).  The author refers to Fire Department City of New York 
(FDNY) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the use of rescue companies, ―1.1 
Rescue Companies (RCOS) have a unique mission beyond the normal elements of fire 
extinguishment.  They provide a wide range of services, including the rescue of civilians 
or firefighters in extraordinary situations, extrication, and victim removal, when their 




just being a fire suppression event and special operations teams are required for extensive 
victim rescue, fire service special operations can summons mental health professionals to 
the scene and assist victims with crisis intervention measures. 
The work of Lowry and Lating examines the initial phase of a catastrophe 
referred to as consequence management and reconstruction phase by emergency mental 
health professionals, and it is during this phase they are tasked with the psychological 
rebuilding of communities (2002 p. 98).  Immediately, mental health professionals can 
begin employing the principles of critical incident stress management (CISM) to combat 
and restore psychological health to the community (Lowry & Lating, 2002).  CISM is 
referred to as ―psychological first aid‖ and can be applied to victims as well as any first 
responder that may need crisis intervention management (Everly & Mitchell, 2002, p. 
17).  These measures are designed to intervene and rapidly reduce mental suffering 
imposed upon victims due to a critical incident.  While fire service first responders are in 
a reactive phase of the incident, they are assisting mental health professionals in a 
proactive phase of protecting the mental health of the community. 
According to an article in The New York Academy of Medicine (2005), New 
Yorkers suffered significantly fewer mental health problems for up to two years after the 
9/11 disaster by participating in emergency crisis counseling.  Dr. Joseph Boscarino, 
Senior Scientist in the Academy’s Division of Health and Science Policy, stated the study 
has major implications for the use of emergency mental health treatment following 
terrorist attacks as well as other traumatic events (2005).  He further stated that scientists 
had been reluctant to conduct research on disaster victims for fear of causing additional 
suffering (Boscarino, 2005).  Boscarino concluded by stating ―Based on our current 
findings, we suggest that crisis intervention services should be considered as a first line 
of emergency management for those potentially affected by large-scale community 
disasters‖ (2005). 
6. Risk Assessment and Fiscal Management 
Compton and Granito recommend the fire service evaluate risk and plan for 
necessary resources (2002, p. 39). Risk is defined by the National Fire Protection 
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Association (NFPA) Standard 1250, Recommended Practice in Emergency Service 
Organization Risk Management (2000) edition, ―as the measure of probability and 
severity of adverse effects that result from exposure to hazard‖ (Compton & Granito, 
2002, p. 39).  Since risk assessments are particular to a specific community, results will 
vary (Compton & Granito).  Risks can be identified by losses that have occurred and 
potential losses (Compton & Granito).  The complexity of the risk regarding frequency 
and severity must be analyzed within the community (Compton & Granito), Once risks 
are identified and analyzed, they must be prioritized by a classification or level (Compton 
& Granito, 2002, pp. 41–44).  Other potential risk factors that should be considered are: 
 Where does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rank the city in 
relation to vulnerability for terrorist targets? 
 Are there risks outside of fire suppression and significant to the 
community that would require specialized technical rescue operations (i.e., 
hazardous materials, confined space, swift water, rescue diving)? 
 How can injury prevention relating to public health reduce the public 
health care epidemic by preventing and/or reducing debilitating injuries, 
permanent disabilities, or premature death, further decreasing the expense 
to the nation’s health care system? (Compton & Granito, 2002, p. 50) 
The fire service has traditionally been managed by objectives and operational 
goals with very little emphasis on fiscal management, according to Compton and Granito 
(2002, p. 168).  Fiscal management is: 
…calibrating the use of resources with citizens’ perceptions of need; it is 
managing the financial resources that have been attributed or allocated to 
the fire and rescue organization in such as way as to ensure that the 
organization can remain true to its vision, carry out its mission, and 
achieve its objectives in the context of organizational values. (Compton & 
Granito, 2002, p. 167)   
This concept creates a positive link between the citizens and the fire service by 
involving them in the governance of planning with local government (Compton & 
Granito, 2002).  It is important that taxpayer dollars are tracked for the financial record, 
but from the perspective of fiscal management, it is even more important to determine 
what citizens see as important before directing resources toward an objective (Compton 
& Granito).  The overall objective of fiscal management is providing fire services that  
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make citizens’ lives safer and better (Compton & Granito, p. 167).  As the fire service 
accepts change by establishing special operations teams, a change in the management of 
fire services is warranted. 
When proactive fire departments expand services by implementing special 
operations teams, they must also consider how to fund and maintain them.  Hall and 
Demitrov examine the life-cycle cost (LCC) theory as a method used to ―identify and 
quantify the costs of achieving and sustaining preparedness capabilities across the nation‖ 
(Hall & Demitrov, 2009, p. 1).  LCC methodology estimates start-up cost components 
(i.e., people, equipment, and training), forecasts the annual operating cost, and long-term 
equipment cost associated with repair, upgrade, or replacement (Hall & Demitrov).  The 
model is flexible due to cost variables and capability components particular to an agency.  
Implementation of this methodology follows six steps (Hall & Demitrov): 
1. Determine the capability elements 
2. Identify and characterize capability components 
3. Develop LCC variables for each component 
4. Develop a cost model 
5. Annualize the cost model and identify cost drivers 
6. Link the model to national targets and assigned levels. (Hall & Demitrov, 
2009, pp. 5–9) 
The outcome of the calculations based on the criteria listed above should provide 
an accurate budgetary cost for operating and sustaining special operations teams.  
7. Conclusion 
As shown in this literature review, there are multiple issues that require 
consideration when analyzing the need for fire service special operations teams.  While 
parallels can be drawn with military SOF, there is a distinct difference between military 
and civilian response actions.  It will be local first responders that will respond utilizing 
their available resources to manage a catastrophic event within the community. 
Requesting additional resources from the state and federal governments will be made by 
politicians through disaster declarations.   
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Conducting risk assessments will be necessary to understand potential risks or 
vulnerabilities within a community.  When risk assessments are completed and the 
potential for high risk incidents determined, the fire service can enhance their response 
and protection capabilities by implementing special operations teams. The perception of 
the community (taxpayers) feeling safe and secure will have an important impact on fire 
service delivery within communities.  The taxpayers’ expectations regarding safety and 
security will have an effect, positive or negative, on fire service budgets. 
D. HYPOTHESES 
There are multiple issues to consider when analyzing the need for special 
operations teams within the fire service to respond and carry out the mission of rescuing 
people from all hazards during any emergency or catastrophe such as:   
 Special operations teams are essential to local communities;  
 Local first responders must be prepared to respond and sustain continuous 
emergency rescue efforts;   
 Special operations teams are expensive to fund and operate. 
Special operations teams are essential to local communities because government 
guidelines place responsibility on first responders to effectively respond, manage chaos, 
take command, and deploy and place resources, all while rescuing people. Rescuing 
victims and saving lives is a priority of the fire service and homeland security strategies.  
It is the actions of first responders that will determine the scope, length, and operational 
periods of the catastrophe.  The evidence supporting first responder responsibilities and 
priorities is found in several government documents.  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security 2007 (NSHS) defines homeland security as ―a concerted national 
effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability 
to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover from the attacks that do occur‖ (DHS, 
2007b, p. 3).  The NSHS further states that ―it is our collective duty to provide the best 
response possible‖ to any catastrophe (DHS, 2007b, p. 31).  The National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) states that all catastrophes are local and should be handled  
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at the local jurisdiction level (DHS, 2008b).  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 7, section 13 outlines human life as the highest priority when conducting risk 
assessments (Metoeff, 2005, p. 23). 
Local first responders must be prepared to respond and sustain continuous 
emergency rescue efforts through mutual aid and automatic response agreements with 
partnering communities because federal requests for assistance will not be immediate. 
The formal emergency declaration approval process is determined by politicians. 
Politicians may delay their decision in requesting federal assistance because they want to 
further evaluate and confirm that the magnitude of the incident will continue to rise 
requiring federal resources, in the meantime lives are at risk.  Other reasons for a federal 
response being delayed and/or limited include: availability of resources being requested, 
time factor in locating specialized equipment with operators, and location of the resource 
to the incident.  The evidence supporting the argument that federal request will not be 
immediate is the Stafford Act, which outlines the formal procedures that government 
officials must follow for requesting federal assistance (Brazan, 2005).  The 9/11 
Commission Report attributes delays in response to bureaucracies when it states: ―It is 
hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor.  Once the danger has 
fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier—but then it may be too late‖ 
(9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 350).  When or if a federal emergency declaration request is 
approved, there is a time delay in locating the required resources and dispatching them to 
the proper location.  
Special operations teams are expensive to fund and operate.  The cost of special 
operations teams added to the fire service budget increases the cost of the overall 
operating budget.  Reasons for the high cost to fund special operations teams are risks 
outside fire suppression and significant to the community require specialized technical 
training and certification.  Evidence for this argument can be found in Fire Department 
Special Operations (Norman, 2007).  The author emphasizes the point that the extensive 
list of special operations tools and equipment are cost prohibitive to put on all fire 
apparatus (Norman, 2007). He further explains that it requires numerous hours of training 
for special operations teams to be proficient in the operation of all specialized tools and 
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equipment (Norman, 2007).  The fire service has a limited ability and need, like the 
military, to train all fire personnel in special operations (Norman, 2007, p. 8); however, 
the high-risk/low-frequency events that special operations teams respond to require 
highly trained and certified personnel to successfully complete rescue missions.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The content of this research is relevant to real concerns of the fire service today.  
The objective is for the fire service to move away from the status quo and ensure optimal 
homeland security preparedness and response capabilities.  The result of this study will 
provide fire service professionals with an enhanced framework to consider when 
analyzing the need for and incorporating special operations teams within their 
departments. 
This thesis will provide a clearer and better understanding for the fire service to 
engage as willing participants in homeland security.  This thesis can also provide other 
national homeland security practitioners and leaders a greater understanding of the fire 
service’s contribution to homeland security.  Multiple government documents have been 
written directing the fire service toward a more prominent role in homeland security and 
defense.  As such, this thesis may be useful to fire service professionals in evaluating 
how their fire departments rate in the overall homeland security project. 
F. METHOD 
In order to answer the research question:  Could combining special operations in 
the fire service achieve greater efficiency and stronger homeland security and defense?  
The first step will be to identify the capabilities and requirements of several special 
operations teams.  The next step will be to analyze the feasibility of combining one or 
more teams.  Recommendations will then be developed based on the analysis derived 
from this two part methodology.  
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1. Part I: Analyzing the Capabilities and Requirements of Several 
Special Operations Teams 
This thesis will examine three Dallas Fire-Rescue (DFR) special operations teams 
as case studies.  DFR jointly houses a Hazardous Material Response Team (HMRT), 
Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Team, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team.  
These three teams were chosen because they each have unique capabilities.  These teams 
also have capabilities not present in many fire departments; they exceed basic firefighting 
knowledge, skills, and abilities.  Each special operations team requires specialized 
training, tools, monitors, detectors, and other advanced technological equipment.  Only 
approximately 10 percent of fire departments have EOD teams, they are more common to 
law enforcement (Cox, 2004). 
Each team will be investigated according to Dallas Fire-Rescue manual of 
procedures and standard emergency operating procedures to understand how they are 
used, how they are organized, and their capabilities.  Next, their core training curriculums 
will be mapped to existing standards; National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
Standards, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Standards, International 
Fire Service Accreditation Congress (IFSAC), or other standards that pertain to the 
particular team.  Core knowledge, skills, and abilities will be defined and charted for each 
of the teams.  The cost of training and the standards will be charted as well.  Finally, each 
special operations team homeland security role will be evaluated using government 
documents such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives. 
2. Part II: Analyzing the Feasibility of Combining One or More Teams 
Based on the analysis above, the combination of one or more teams will be 
explored.  In order to analyze the feasibility and value of combining special operations 




1. Feasibility from the fire service standpoint and the practicality of special 
operations teams in the fire service. 
2. Whether special operations teams can complement or support other special 
operations teams. 
3. Whether the framework charted for special operations teams is flexible 
enough for many fire departments to utilize when establishing or 
maintaining special operations teams. 
The first parameter is the feasibility from the fire service standpoint including 
special operations teams as an enhancement to public safety and the practicality of this 
endeavor.  This will be evaluated by charting the cost of training, type of training 
required, and looking for redundancy in the core curriculum.   
The second parameter considers whether special operations teams can 
complement or support other special operations teams in a joint effort to accomplish the 
stated mission.  The role of complement or support could be determined by comparing 
the capabilities of the teams, how they are used, and how they are organized. 
The last parameter is whether the framework charted for special operations teams 
is flexible enough for many fire departments to utilize when establishing or maintaining 
special operations teams.  The charted information should guide departments in assessing 
whether they could make some modifications for incorporating special operations teams, 
or if gradually phasing in a special operations team is a consideration. 
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II. DALLAS FIRE-RESCUE (DFR) HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
RESPONSE TEAM (HMRT) 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team is to mitigate, 
contain, and control intentional or accidental releases of hazardous materials in the safest 
and most effective manner possible (DFR, 2008a, p. 1).  The City of Dallas (COD) 
Administrative Directive 3-74 designates DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team as 
the primary responder to hazardous materials releases or spills in the city of Dallas (City 
of Dallas [COD], 2004a, p. 1). Hazardous materials are just that (hazardous) and are 
defined in the Federal Register; 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 302 and 
hazardous waste is defined in 40 CFR Part 261 (COD, 2004a, p. 2). 
B. ORGANIZATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE TEAM 
DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team members are certified firefighters and 
hazardous materials technicians performing dual function roles.  The combining of these 
duties is not uncommon to the fire service; several surrounding jurisdictions in the 
metroplex have the same type structure.  Likewise, all members are required by the Texas 
Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) to hold a structural firefighter certification prior 
to a Hazardous Materials Technician certification being awarded (Texas Commission on 
Fire Protection [TCFP], 2007a).  TCFP is the regulatory authority that enforces statewide 
fire service standards and provides education and assistance to the fire service as defined 
by Chapter 419 of the Texas Government Code (TCFP, 2010b). 
Prior to hazardous materials technicians’ being assigned to the Hazardous 
Materials Response Team, they are required to undergo an entry medical physical and 
annually thereafter (DFR, 2008a, pp. 17–18).  This requirement meets the medical 




CFR 1910.120 (f) Medical Surveillance, which mandates employers provide medical 
examinations and consultations to members of Hazardous Materials Teams (Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration [OSHA], 2010, p. 376). 
When the DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team is dispatched to a hazardous 
materials incident while at the station, the members will respond on the apparatus 
(Hazmat 03) that carries equipment, instruments, monitors, and tools needed for 
mitigating a hazardous materials event (DFR, 2008a).  In the circumstance that the 
Hazardous Materials Response Team is at another emergency, such as a working 
structure fire and a hazardous materials response occurs, fire dispatch will notify the on-
scene incident commander of the request for a hazardous materials emergency response 
(2008a).  If the incident commander approves the release of the Hazardous Materials 
Response Team, fire dispatch will send a replacement structure fire response to the 
location of the working fire (2008a).  The Hazardous Materials Response Team will clear 
the emergency scene, retrieve Hazmat 03 from the station, and respond to the hazardous 
materials incident (2008a).  If the incident commander feels that he/she cannot release the 
Hazardous Materials Response Team because they are committed to an integral part of 
the fire response and rescue efforts, then a mutual aid Hazardous Materials Response 
Team will be called (DFR, 2008a).  
Anytime the DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team is not immediately 
available for an emergency hazmat response, mutual aid teams from the surrounding 
jurisdictions can have fluctuating response times due to availability and proximity to the 
hazmat incident.  Nonetheless, the emergency hazmat response will be delayed, 
increasing the risks to the community and creating further challenges to the mitigation 
efforts. 
Minimum staffing requirements for the DFR Hazardous Materials Response 
Team is constant manning of 10 hazardous materials technicians and at least one of the 
10 must be a hazmat officer (DFR, 2008a, p. 14).  The Hazardous Materials Response 
Team’s minimum staffing requirements are derived from several sources and are used in 
conjunction to determine minimum staffing because hazardous materials response is 
regulated by numerous laws, standards, codes, and recommendations.  A significant 
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regulation regarding the staffing of the Hazardous Materials Response Team is found in 
the Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1910.120 (a) (3) which defines the buddy 
system (OSHA, 2010): 
Buddy system means a system of organizing employees into work groups 
in such a manner that each employee of the work group is designated to be 
observed by at least one other employee in the work group.  The purpose 
of the buddy system is to provide rapid assistance to employees in the 
event of an emergency. (OSHA, 2010, p. 369) 
The risks to hazardous materials technicians are elevated when working in 
unpredictable immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) environments and 
operating as partners increases the safety factor for each individual.  Essentially 
hazardous materials technicians are responsible for each other’s safety and well being, 
they are obligated to function in pairs and never freelance (work alone). 
Furthermore, requirements for emergency rescue procedures for hazardous 
materials incidents are articulated in the Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1910.120 
(q) (3) (vi) ―Back-up personnel shall be standing by with equipment ready to provide 
assistance or rescue.  Qualified basic life support personnel, as a minimum, shall also be 
standing by with medical equipment and transportation capability‖ (OSHA, 2006).  The 
OSHA procedures for hazmat incidents are in-line with the emergency rescue procedures 
of ―two in/two out‖ for firefighters as defined in NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire 
Department Occupational Safety and Health Program when operating in immediately 
dangerous to life or health (IDLH) environments. 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is an international non-profit 
organization and leading authority on fire safety, codes and standards, research, training, 
and education (National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2011a).  The NFPA sets the 
standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Incidents in NFPA 472.  NFPA 472 reinforces the buddy system as stated in 
CFR 1910.120 as well as competencies for staffing a safety officer, decontamination 
(decon) officer, and incident commander positions during response missions (NFPA, 
2008b). 
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A hazardous materials response mission for DFR Hazardous Materials Response 
Team will proceed with the hazardous materials technicians (HMT) being assigned to the 
following roles (DFR, 2008a): 
 One HMT commander 
 One HMT safety officer 
 One HMT decon officer 
 One HMT communications/research officer 
 Two HMTs entry team 
 Two HMTs rescue team 
 Two HMTs paramedics medical team (2008a) 
The HMT commander will be responsible for the entire hazardous materials 
operations throughout the event (DFR, 2008a).  If the hazardous materials event is a 
component of a larger scale incident, the HMT commander will advise the prevailing 
incident commander on all hazmat issues (2008a).  The HMT safety officer is dedicated 
to monitoring operations of the Hazardous Materials Response Team and ensuring the 
safety of the operations during the incident (DFR, 2008a).  If the HMT safety officer 
feels that any action or component of the operation is unsafe, it must be reported to the 
HMT commander immediately and the operation will be suspended (2008a).  In case the 
HMT safety officer feels an action is immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH), 
he/she has the authority to stop the IDLH action instantly (2008a).  The decon officer is 
tasked with supervising the decontamination corridor setup and level of procedures 
required for decontaminating Hazardous Materials Response Team personnel and 
equipment (DFR, 2008a).  The decon officer must have the decontamination area 
operational prior to the HMT entry team entering a contaminated area (hot zone) (2008a).  
The HMT communications/research officer will maintain radio communications between 
the hazardous materials response team and the incident channel to keep the Incident 
Commander informed of the Hazardous Materials Response Teams’ status during the 
entire operation (2008a).  Two HMTs will don the appropriate personnel protective 
equipment (PPE) and become the primary entry team into the hot zone or hazardous 
environment to mitigate the incident (2008a).  Two HMTs will stand-by, also donning the 
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appropriate PPE, and become the rescue team for the primary entry team (2008a).  Two 
HMT paramedics are dedicated for the emergency medical monitoring/treatment of the 
Hazardous Material Response Team only and will stand-by until the incident is 
terminated by the HMT commander (DFR, 2008a). 
C. CAPABILITIES 
The DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team has the capabilities to respond to 
three levels of hazardous materials incidents (DFR, 2008a)  The response levels are 
usually defined by local emergency planning committees (LEPC) in determining the 
jurisdictions vulnerabilities and capabilities for response and developing a hazardous 
materials emergency plan (National Response Team, 2001).  The level of hazmat event 
and classification for Dallas is explained in the next sections (DFR, 2008a). 
1. Level 1  
Level 1 is classified as an incident of limited scope and short duration.  The 
HMRT can mitigate this type of incident with minimal impact to the environment.  
Evacuation is not necessary and the scene can be returned to its normal pre-incident state 
before the hazard occurred. 
2. Level 2 
Level 2 is classified as an emergency which is larger in scope and duration.  An 
emergency has the complexity for potential degrees of risk and exposure of hazardous 
substances to the population and environment.  Additional Dallas Fire Rescue, city 
resources, or mutual aid may be required to mitigate this emergency. 
3. Level 3 
Level 3 is classified as a disaster involving mass casualties, fatalities, illness, 
large scale environmental damage, or the potential threat of significant injuries and/or 
impact to the environment.  The probabilities for a large scale evacuation or sheltering-in-
place will need to be determined for immediate health and safety of the population.  A 
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disaster will most likely be of a long duration, exceed the resources the city of Dallas can 
provide, and will require external resources and assistance (DFR, 2008a, p. 11). 
D. STANDARDS FOR CURRICULUMS 
The Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) is the regulatory authority that 
enforces statewide fire service standards and provides education and assistance to the fire 
service as defined by Chapter 419 of the Texas Government Code (TCFP, 2010b).  In the 
state of Texas, certification with the TCFP is mandatory for paid fire protection personnel 
to ensure the safety of fire personnel and compliance of fire departments with state laws 
and regulations (TCFP, 2007a).  
The TCFP provides the certification curriculum for hazardous materials 
technician in Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter Six Hazardous Materials NFPA 
472, 2008 Edition (TCFP, 2010a).  The TCFP curriculum follows practically verbatim 
Chapter VII, Competencies for Hazardous Materials Technicians in the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to 
Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents 2008 edition (NFPA, 
2008b).  Clearly, NFPA 472 is the source for hazardous materials technician training and 
education. 
The International Fire Service Accreditation Congress (IFSAC) is a non-profit 
peer-driven organization authorized by the Board of Regents of Oklahoma State 
University that accredits fire service certification programs and higher education fire-
related degree programs (International Fire Service Accreditation Congress [IFSAC], 
2010).  The goal of this governing body is to increase the level of professionalism in the 
fire service by verifying that participating programs are adhering to nationally recognized 
standards such as the National Fire Protection Association Standards (IFSAC, 2005, pp. 
1–3).  IFSAC has reviewed, approved, and accredited the Texas Commission on Fire 
Protection’s Hazardous Materials Technician certification program (TCFP, n.d.a).  The 




successfully completed and met the requirements for TCFP hazardous materials 
technician (TCFP, n.d.a). The benefit of an IFSAC seal signifies one as being trained to 
higher nationally recognized standards (TCFP, n.d.a). 
Continuing education (CE) hours are required annually by the Texas Commission 
on Fire Protection so as to keep Dallas Fire-Rescue personnel certifications active and the 
department in compliance with all TCFP rules.  The TCFP requires a minimum of 20 
hours continuing education for structural firefighters along with an additional 10 hours 
for hazardous materials technicians (TCFP, n.d.b).  Dallas Fire-Rescue requires all 
emergency operations hazardous materials technicians to complete a minimum of 20 
hours continuing education pertaining to hazardous materials and a minimum of 20 hours 
in structural firefighting. (DFR, 2008a, p. 9).  It has been a ritual for DFR hazardous 
materials technicians to exceed the mandated ten (10) hours of continuing education 
because of the included emphasis on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Most of the 
continuing education training hours are accomplished during regular on-duty work hours. 
E. CORE KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITIES 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA), for hazardous materials 
technicians are listed in Table 1 and obtained directly from NFPA 472 Standard for 
Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Incidents (NFPA, 2008b) and Section 604 of Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter 
Six Hazardous Materials NFPA 472, 2008 Edition, Texas Commission on Fire Protection 
(TCFP, 2010a).  Core KSA define the capabilities of a Hazardous Materials Technician 
and what is required for the individual to effectively function in the role of a hazardous 
material technician to successfully accomplish missions they are tasked with.  See Table 
1 NFPA 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Incidents (After NFPA, 2008b) and Section 604 of Certification 




Table 1.   Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Hazardous Material Technicians 
(After TCFP, 2010a) 




General knowledge of laws, regulations, and national standards 
 
Ability to analyze the hazardous materials/WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 
incident to determine complexity of problems and potential outcomes 
 
Skills to survey the hazardous materials/WMD incident to indentify special 
containers, storage tanks, railroad cars, non-bulk packaging, and radioactive 
packaging; indentify or classify unknown hazardous materials; verify the presence 
and concentrations of hazardous materials through the use of instrumentation, 
detection and monitoring equipment 
 
Skills to collect and interpret hazard and response information from printed and 
technical resources, computer databases, and monitoring equipment 
 
Ability to describe the condition of the container involved in the incident and assess 
the level of risk associated with the damage 
 
Ability to predict the likely behavior of released materials and their containers with 
multiple materials involved 
 
Ability to estimate the likely size of an endangered area 
 
Ability to plan a response within the capabilities of available personnel, defining 
objectives, potential options, and selecting proper personnel protective equipment 
 
Ability to select a technical decontamination process to minimize the hazard 
 
Ability to develop a plan of action for hazardous materials/WMD incident 
 
Skills to implement the planned response to favorably change the outcome  
 
Skills to perform the incident command duties within the local incident 
management system  
 
Skills to don and effectively function in protective clothing and respiratory 
protection 
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Skills to perform control functions identified in the Incident Action Plan (IAP) 
 
Skills to perform decontamination functions identified in the Incident Action Plan 
(IAP) 
 
Ability to evaluate the progress of the hazardous materials incident/WMD 
concerning the effectiveness of the control functions and decontamination process 
 
Knowledge to terminate the hazardous materials/WMD incident 
 
Knowledge to assist in the incident debriefing and incident critique 
 
Skills to provide reports and documentation of the hazardous materials/WMD 
incident 
 
F. COST OF TRAINING 
The cost of training hazardous materials technicians can vary depending on where 
the class is held (locally versus out-of-town requiring a hotel stay and per diem 
allowances) and the number of people that need to be trained.  Along with the cost of all 
the required training for the class comes the associated cost of the backfill for the 
member that is attending hazardous materials technician training.  Backfill is the 
replacement staffing cost for the vacant position the member attending school creates.  
Backfill is calculated at an estimated overtime rate because the member usually staffing 
the vacant position is assigned to another shift and will exceed their normal hours worked 
during a pay period thus drawing overtime pay. 
In order to determine an accurate estimated cost for training hazardous materials 
technicians, a few substantial factors bear consideration, such as locating and selecting an 
accredited TCFP hazardous materials technician class with reasonable tuition rates and 
determine the number of individuals allowed to attend training at one time due to DFR 
daily mandatory staffing level requirements.  At the time of this writing, the most cost 
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effective TCFP accredited class offered is local in proximity to the city of Dallas at a cost 
of $580.00 per person (Tarrant County College Fire Service Training Center, n.d.b). 
According to an e-mail from the DFR Financial Services Assistant Director, the 
actual hourly overtime rate for all ranks (fire and rescue officer, driver engineer, 
lieutenant, captain, or battalion chief) is $37.00.  However, the average backfill hourly 
rate includes figuring 27.5 percent for pension benefits [$37.00 x 27.5% = 10.175 + 37.00 
= 47.175], which makes the current accurate backfill estimate $47.00 per hour. 
DFR members attending hazardous materials technician training are normally 
assigned to 24-hour shifts.  It will be necessary to adjust the DFR members’ work 
schedule while they attend the 80-hour HMT training course.  The member attending 
HMT training will be placed on training leave and relieved of their station work 
assignment for the duration of the class.  Members assigned to a 24 hour shift will receive 
12-hours credit for each day spent in class. (DFR, 2008, pp. 401–403).  For the 80-hour 
HMT class, scheduled for 10 days at eight hours per day, each member will be placed on 
training leave for a total of five 24-hour shifts.  This creates a vacant position at each 
station for five 24-hour shifts that DFR members are on training leave and must be 
replaced with qualified DFR personnel (backfill) due to mandatory minimum staffing 
levels.   
The city of Dallas follows the standard mileage rates established by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).  The current IRS standard mileage rate of 51 cents per mile will 
be used for estimating mileage reimbursement cost (Internal Revenue Service [IRS], 
2010).  Actual mileage for DFR members attending training locally will be calculated 
from each member’s normal work assignment to the location the class is being 
conducted.  The mileage estimate used for Table 2 is calculated from the DFR Training 
Academy to the location of the scheduled HMT class. 
The Texas Commission on Fire Protection charges a standard fee of $35.00 for 
each application for certification once the hazardous materials technician has successfully 
passed the commission exam (TCFP, n.d.b).  After the $35.00 fee is received and 
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processed, the TCFP will send the HMTs certificate of certification to Dallas Fire-Rescue 
and update the commission’s database to reflect each individual that possesses a 
Hazardous Materials Technician Certificate (TCFP, n.d.b). 
Another significant cost that must to be figured into the overall cost of training 
personnel, is an initial medical physical.  Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1910.120 
(f) Medical Surveillance directs employers to establish a medical surveillance program 
requiring members of Hazardous Materials Response Teams to undergo a medical 
physical every 12 months (United States Department of Labor, 2011).  Dallas Fire-
Rescue provides a medical surveillance program for all Hazardous Materials Response 
Team members in accordance with regulation the listed above (DFR, 2008a, p. 17).  
Before a hazardous materials technician can be assigned to the HMRT, a medical 
physical must be completed and a physician must deem the individual medically fit for 
participation in the HMRT (DFR, 2008a, pp. 17–18).  All HMRT members will complete 
a medical physical every 12 months, as stated above (DFR, 2008a, p. 17). 
At the time of this research, DFR does not have a Hazardous Materials Response 
Team medical surveillance vendor contract for 2011, but a request proposal for medical 
surveillance has been submitted to the DFR Financial Services Assistant Director.  The 
city purchasing agent has not completed the bid process for medical physicals.  
According to past medical surveillance records protected under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules and kept 
by the hazardous materials coordinator, the current proposal for medical physicals could 
be estimated at a cost of approximately $1,900.00 per individual physical.  This is the 
figure that will be used to factor in the total cost of training a DFR hazardous materials 
technician, refer to Table 2.  
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Table 2.   Cost for Training a Hazardous Materials Technician 


























$580.00 80 hours $5,640.00 $435.50 $35.00 $1,900.00 
 Total Cost 
Per Person 
$8,590.50 
According to the research displayed in Table 2, the accurate estimated total cost to 
train one Dallas Fire-Rescue member to the level of a hazardous materials technician is 
$8,590.50. 
G. EVALUATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE TEAM 
(HMRT) HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has focused much attention on dangerous 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  WMD can be developed using chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents.  While CBRN incidents can be 
classified as hazardous materials incidents, the amount, combination, method used to 
disperse these agents, locations of the release, and number of human fatalities, as well as 
the overall impact to the community, will dictate the level to which an incident is 
classified.  The level of classification could range from a local emergency incident to a 
mass casualty incident (MCI) requiring extensive resources and could further be 
complicated by decontamination requirements. 
One of America’s toughest challenges stated in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security is ―WMD in the hands of terrorists is one of the gravest threats we 
face, and we cannot permit the world’s most dangerous terrorists to threaten us with the 
world’s most destructive weapons‖ (DHS, 2007b, p. 15).  Hazardous Materials Response 
Teams have an integral role to play on the frontlines by responding to and interdicting 
threats of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents when our layers of 
defense have been infiltrated.  Trained Hazardous Materials Response Technicians are a 
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critical component in determining the level of classification a hazardous materials event 
will be by using specialized equipment (i.e., instrumentation, monitors, detectors, and 
other sampling collection devices) to make on-scene risk evaluations.  
Hazardous Materials Response Teams are in line with Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 in that they enhance the capabilities across the nation by using a 
―national approach to domestic incident management‖ (DHS, 2003a).  Once a Hazardous 
Material Response Team has assessed the risk evaluation of an event, they can determine 
if the incident can be mitigated with the resources available or if conditions are such that 
require a substantially larger amount of resources. 
In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Policy number 
eight (8), that states (2003a):  
Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that falls within the 
criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United 
States shall be dedicated, consistent with United States law and with 
activities of other Federal departments and agencies to protect our national 
security, to assisting the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and 
bring them to justice. (Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2003a) 
It will most likely be Hazardous Materials Response Teams with their specialized 
training and equipment assisting federal departments, other law enforcement agencies, 
and the Attorney General in seeking justice by being the primary evidence collectors of 
hazardous substances from terrorist threats or any actual event that will determine if the 
cause was terrorism. 
Strengthening national preparedness is the subject of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) (DHS, 2008a), which is precisely the function 
Hazardous Materials Response Teams provide by improving our ability to shape 
operational actions through the National Incident Management System (NIMS) concept 
of coordination and strategic preparedness goals (DHS, 2008b).  HMRT is a special 
operations resource of the fire service at the local level that can support and strengthen 
national preparedness goals outlined in HSPD-8. 
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Hazardous Materials Response Teams are part of the comprehensive strategy for 
countering WMD and represents one of the appropriate civilian agencies described in 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-4 (HSPD-4) [unclassified version], National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, that are prepared to respond and 
defend the homeland from complex threats of  CBRN events (Federation of American 
Scientists, 2002).  As first responders, Hazardous Materials Response Teams are on the 
forefront working to alleviate further risk and impacts of catastrophic disasters within 
communities they serve, while participating in the complex challenges of homeland 




III. DALLAS FIRE-RESCUE (DFR) URBAN SEARCH AND 
RESCUE TEAM (US&R) 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the DFR Urban Search and Rescue Team (US&R), is to respond 
and mitigate unique multi-hazard emergencies or events caused by terrorist attack, natural 
or man-made disasters (DFR, 2008b). These events may involve no fire threat, the 
potential to ignite, or those that are on fire (Norman, 2009).  US&R Team members are 
capable of supporting emergencies in progress or events such as weather-related incidents 
that may gradually develop with advanced technical rescue skills, thus exceeding the 
basic fire responder’s qualifications and ability to safety respond in a complex rescue 
environment (DFR, 2008b). 
B. ORGANIZATION OF DFR URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAM 
The US&R Team serves a dual function role in Dallas Fire-Rescue; members are 
full-time structural firefighters and a full-time urban search and rescue team.  The US&R 
Team members are certified structural firefighters and trained in various levels of urban 
search and rescue.  All members must hold a certification as a structural firefighter with 
the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP).  TCFP is the regulatory authority that 
enforces statewide fire service standards and provides education and assistance to the fire 
service as defined by Chapter 419 of the Texas Government Code (TCFP, 2010b). 
DFR has two fire stations (15 and 19) that are designated as US&R stations (DFR, 
2008b).  Each station must have a daily minimum staffing of 10 US&R trained members 
and one of the 10 must be an officer (DFR, 2008b, p. 13).  Members assigned to station 
15 or 19 will be trained and certified in five different disciplines within search and rescue 
training (2008b):  
1. Rope rescue technician 
2. Structural collapse technician 
3. Technical search specialist 
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4. Confined space rescue 
5. Trench rescue (DFR, 2008b) 
Members are eligible for assignment to station 15 or 19, if they are certified in 
two of the five search and rescue disciplines, with the caveat being they must complete 
the remaining required disciplines within a year of assignment.  At a minimum, members 
must be certified as a rope rescue technician and structural collapse technician, or 
technical search specialist, to meet the qualification of two search and rescue disciplines 
for permanent assignment to either station (DFR, 2008b, p. 8). 
Minimum staffing requirements of 10 US&R members for stations 15 and 19 
basically coincide with DFR minimum daily staffing levels department wide of four 
firefighters on every engine and truck (DFR, 2008, p. 266).  Minimum staffing for DFR 
rescues (mobile intensive care units) is two paramedics.  Stations 15 & 19 each house an 
engine, a truck, a rescue and a US&R apparatus for urban search and rescue response.  
The required minimum daily staffing levels department wide for fire apparatus satisfies 
the staffing levels for the dual function role of the US&R Team. 
The foundation for DFR minimum staffing levels are safe operations and quality 
of job performance, which is based on two National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
standards:   
Chapter 5, Fire Department Services, NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization 
and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and 
Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments (NFPA, 2009b) states: 
5.2.3  Operating Units.  Fire company staffing requirements shall be based 
on minimum levels necessary for safe, effective, and efficient emergency 
operations. 
5.2.3.1  Fire companies whose primary functions are to pump and deliver 
water and perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue, 
shall be known as engine companies. 
5.2.3.1.1  These companies shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-
duty personnel. 
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5.2.3.2  Fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the 
variety of services associated with truck work, such as forcible entry, 
ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and 
rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul, and salvage work, shall be 
known as ladder or truck companies. 
5.2.3.2.1  These companies shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-
duty personnel. (NFPA, 2009b, p. 9) 
Chapter 8, Emergency Operations, NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department 
Occupational Safety and Health Program (NFPA, 2006) states: 
8.5.7  In the initial stages of an incident where only one crew is operating 
in the hazardous area at a working structural fire, a minimum of four 
individuals shall be required, consisting of two individuals working as a 
crew in the hazardous area and two individuals present outside this 
hazardous area available for assistance or rescue at emergency operations 
where entry into the danger area is required. 
8.5.8  The standby members shall be responsible for maintaining a 
constant awareness of the number and identity of members operating in 
the hazardous area, their location and function, and time of entry. 
8.5.9  The standby members shall remain in radio, visual, voice, or signal 
line communication with the crew. 
8.5.16  Once a second crew is assigned or operating in the hazardous area, 
the incident shall no longer be considered in the ―initial stage,‖ and at least 
one rapid intervention crew shall be deployed that complies with the 
requirements of 8.8.2. 
8.8.2  A rapid intervention crew/company (RIC) shall consist of at least 
two members and shall be available for rescue of a member or a crew. 
(NFPA, 2006, pp. 24–25) 
The NFPA standards above refer to basic structural firefighting.  These standards 
have been adopted because ―staffing requirements shall be based on minimum levels 
necessary for safe, effective, and efficient emergency operations‖ (NFPA, 2009, p. 9).  
While there is no minimum staffing standard for a full-time US&R Team and given the 
complex nature of technical rescue events, Dallas Fire Rescue follows the NFPA basic 
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structural firefighting standards as a minimum guideline for technical rescue.  Since 
minimum staffing levels for structural firefighting has been determined by the NFPA, it is 
a prudent practice to at least maintain these staffing levels for performing more complex 
special rescue incidents.  Technical rescue events involve complicated intricate 
techniques that are beyond the scope of standard operating procedures (SOP).  Adequate 
levels of trained personnel are required to perform a successful technical rescue because 
the operational environment may or may not involve fire and there is a high potential for 
critical injury or death to the victim or the unprepared rescue team (Norman, 2009, p. 6).  
Due to the high risk involved, it is necessary to maintain a rapid intervention crew (RIC) 
and a medical surveillance component (paramedics) during the rescue procedure in case a 
rescuer becomes a victim. 
The Dallas Fire-Rescue US&R Team is not part of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) national urban search and rescue response system.  
However, DFR does adhere to the FEMA National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
recommendations for search and rescue resource typing (DFR, n.d).  Resource typing 
supports the NIMS initiative by classifying search and rescue resources according to 
capabilities, personnel, equipment, and training.  Classifying federal, state, and local 
response assets prior to a disaster response defines the capability of the resource and 
allows the requesting agency to determine and select what or if a response asset meets the 
response need for a catastrophic event (FEMA, 2007, p. 2).  According to the FEMA 
Typed Resource Definitions Search and Rescue Resources manual, the DFR US&R Team 
is a Type III Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (FEMA, 2007, p. 9). 
C. CAPABILITIES 
DFR US&R Team has capabilities for emergency technical rescue response (i.e., 
rope rescue, structural collapse, confined space, and trench rescue) within the city of 
Dallas, mutual aid to any city contiguous to Dallas, and a regional response to 16 
designated north Texas counties (DFR, 2008b, p. 1).  These emergency responses are 
defined as: Tier 1 response—inside the city limits of Dallas and mutual aid to contiguous 
cities; Tier 2 response—is a regional response to the 16-county region (i.e., Collin, 
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Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Erath, Hood, Hunt, Johnson, Kaufman, Navarro, Palo Pinto, Parker, 
Rockwall, Somervell, Tarrant, and Wise counties) as defined by the North Central Texas 
Council of Governments (NCTCOG) (DFR, 2008b, pp. 5–6). 
When responding to a Tier 1 incident, US&R 15 and 19 will immediately respond 
with a total of 20 urban search and rescue members (DFR, 2008b).  Other support units 
and resources will be dispatched to the incident (i.e., four hazardous materials 
technicians, two logistics command technicians, and two battalion chiefs to serve as a 
task force leader and a safety officer for a full complement of 28 personnel for a Type III 
US&R Task Force) (2008b).  Depending on the type of technical rescue, severity or 
complexity of the event, other resources can be special called to the incident if needed, 
such as structural engineers, physicians, heavy equipment, search and rescue canines, etc. 
(2008b). 
In the event of a Tier 2 regional response, US&R 15 and 19 (20 urban search and 
rescue members), Hazardous Materials Response Unit with four hazardous materials 
technicians, three logistics command technicians, and battalion chiefs to fill the task force 
leader or safety officer positions will respond to the DFR Training Academy to assemble 
a convoy and proceed to the technical rescue incident together (DFR, 2008b, p.6).  An 
advance team comprised of a battalion chief and logistics command technician can be 
selected to proceed to the location of the disaster, perform a reconnaissance, make 
contact with the jurisdiction having authority, and provide the responding convoy with 
accurate updated information (2008b).  Other special call resources can be determined 
and requested as necessary. 
D. STANDARDS FOR CURRICULUMS 
The standards for urban search and rescue core curriculums in the disciplines of 
rope rescue technician, structural collapse technician, confined space rescue, and trench 
rescue adhere to specific National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards.  There 
are no specific National Fire Protection Association standards for a technical search 
specialist other than the general requirements stated in Chapter 4 Technical Rescuer, 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical Rescuer 
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Professional Qualifications 2008 Edition, where the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) 
will establish the training and rescue operations requirements to satisfy the needs of the 
jurisdiction (NFPA, 2008a, p. 13). 
According to Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX), a member of the 
Texas A & M University System and leader in educating and training emergency 
responders (Texas Engineering Extension Service [TEEX], n.d.a) only FEMA National 
US&R task force members can attend FEMA-sanctioned training courses. TEEX 
developed a Disaster Technical Search Specialist course that mirrors the FEMA US&R 
curriculum because of the high demand from jurisdictions requesting disaster technical 
search specialist training at the same level as FEMA task force members (TEEX, 2009b, 
p. 3).  The TEEX disaster technical search specialist training draws from the guidelines of 
the National Preparedness Vision, National Planning Scenarios, Target Capabilities List 
(September 2007) and Universal Task List (Version 2.1 issued May 23, 2005) (TEEX, 
2009b, pp. 4–5). 
The National Board on Fire Service Professional Qualifications (NBFSPQ), 
commonly referred to as the Pro Board, is a non-profit third-party organization that 
accredits agencies using the National Fire Protection Association professional 
qualifications standards (Pro Board, 2010).  The mission of the Pro Board is to establish 
an internationally recognized standard for career and volunteer fire departments (2010).  
Agencies accredited by Pro Board can offer individuals certification in the Pro Board 
national registry upon verification of successfully passing a competency exam (2010).  
An advantage of a Pro Board certificate and inclusion in the national registry for 
individuals is reciprocity among departments that recognize the Pro Board certifications 
(2010).  An individual’s cost can range from $5.50 to $15.00 to join the national registry 
and obtain a Pro Board certificate (2010). 
Dallas Fire-Rescue requires that each member of the US&R Team participate in a 
minimum of 40 hours continuing education (CE) encompassing the five search and 
rescue disciplines (DFR, 2008b, p. 9).  These 40 CE hours are in addition to the 20 CE 
hours required by the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) for structural 
firefighters.  There is no requirement by the TCFP, the state regulatory authority, for 
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continuing education training hours in search and rescue.  However, it is the 
responsibility of the sponsoring agency (DFR) to maintain proficiency in search and 
rescue operations and equipment to the level of training and certification that has been 
achieved.  Most continuing education hours are accomplished during regular on-duty 
work hours.  
E. CORE KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITIES 
1. Rope Rescue Technician 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for rope rescue technician are 
listed in Table 3 and obtained directly from Chapter 5 Job Performance Requirements 
and Chapter 6 Rope Rescue of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 
Standard for Technical Rescuer Professional Qualifications 2008 Edition (NFPA, 
2008a).  Core KSA define the capabilities and qualifications for the individual to function 
effectively in the role of rope rescue technician and successfully accomplish missions 
they are tasked with.  It is further recommended that rope rescue technicians have a 
general knowledge of Chapters IV and V from NFPA 1670 Standard on Operations and 
Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents 2009 Edition, which is the standard 
for organizations providing response to technical search and rescue incidents (NFPA, 
2009a).  See Table 3 from Chapter 5 Job Performance Requirements and Chapter 6 Rope 
Rescue of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical 
Rescuer Professional Qualifications 2008 Edition. 
Table 3.   Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Rope Rescue Technicians (After 
NFPA, 2008a) 
Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Rope Rescue Technicians 
 
Knowledge of site operations regarding support resources, managing available 
resource cache, scene lighting, environmental concerns, and managing personnel by 




Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Rope Rescue Technicians 
Ability to analyze the incident:  gather information, determine type of rescue 
needed, and develop an incident action plan 
 
Ability to manage incident hazards so risks to victims and rescuers are minimized 
while remaining cognizant of rescue time constraints 
 
Skills to implement an incident management system, match resources to operational 
needs, and manage incident communications 
 
Knowledge of local policies and procedures, how to operate in a site-specific search 
environment, and maintain personnel accountability 
 
Skills to perform self-rescue techniques 
 
Knowledge to perform ground support for helicopter activities:  landing zones, 
aircraft safety systems, and communications protocols 
 
Knowledge to terminate a technical rescue operation 
 
Knowledge of victim management and local protocols to effectively triage and 
provide care 
 
Skills to secure victim to specialized equipment and remove them from the hazard 
without further injury 
 
Ability to transfer victim to emergency medical services 
 
Knowledge to inspect and maintain personnel protective clothing and rescue 
equipment for operational readiness 
 
Skills to tie knots, bends, and hitches for specific applications 
 
Knowledge of rope/rigging terminology 
 
Ability to select rope and rigging systems, evaluate and anchor properly, and place 
edge protection 
 
Skills to construct and direct a team in a simple rope mechanical advantage system 
and operate properly in low-angle or high-angle operations 
 
Skills to function as a litter attendant in a lowering system 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Rope Rescue Technicians 
 
Skills to construct and direct a lowering operation in a low-angle and high-angle 
environment 
 
Skills to construct and safely operate a belay system 
 
Ability to perform a complete safety system check for personnel safety 
 
Skills to construct a multiple-point anchor system and ensure integrity of the system 
is maintained throughout the operation 
 
Knowledge of angles to forces created in multiple-point anchor systems and 
formulas needed to calculate safety factors for loads 
 
Skills to construct a compound rope mechanical advantage system and a fixed rope 
system safely and effectively 
 
Ability to direct the operation of a compound rope mechanical advantage system in 
a high-angle environment using proper operating methods 
 
Skills to ascend and descend a fixed rope in a high-angle environment in a 
controlled safe manner 
 
Skills to complete an assignment while suspended in a high-angle environment using 
proper techniques 
 
Skills to move a victim in a high-angle environment while minimizing risk to the 
rescuer and victim  
 
Skills to function as a litter attendant in a high-angle environment 
 
Ability to direct a team in the safe removal of a victim suspended from a rope in a 
high-angle environment 
2. Structural Collapse Technician 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for Structural Collapse 
Technician are listed in Table 4 and obtained directly from Chapter 9 Structural 
Collapse, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical 
Rescuer Professional Qualifications 2008 Edition (NFPA, 2008a).  Core KSA define the 
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capabilities and qualifications for the individual to function effectively in the role of 
Structural Collapse Technician and successfully accomplish missions they are tasked 
with.  It is further recommended that Structural Collapse Technicians have a general 
knowledge of Chapters IV and VI from NFPA 1670 Standard on Operations and 
Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents 2009 Edition, which is the standard 
for organizations providing response to technical search and rescue incidents (NFPA, 
2009a).  See Table 4, pulled from Chapter 9 Structural Collapse, National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical Rescuer Professional 
Qualifications 2008 Edition. 
Table 4.   Knowledge, Skills and Abilities for Structural Collapse Technician (After 
NFPA, 2008a) 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Structural Collapse Technician 
 
 
Knowledge of light frame construction types and hazards and effects associated with 
structural collapse 
 
Ability to determine potential victim locations in light frame construction collapse 
incident and establish search areas 
 
Ability to develop a collapse rescue incident action plan for light frame collapse  
 
Skills to implement a collapse rescue incident action plan for a light frame collapse 
structure 
 
Ability to implement an incident management system as applied to the search 
function of locating victims in a light frame collapse structure 
 
Skills to stabilize a collapse light frame structure 
 
Knowledge of resources and support resources for lighting, environmental control, 
and rescuer rehabilitation protocols 
 
Skills to release/remove a victim from entrapment of a light frame collapse structure 
 
Skills to lift/move a heavy lead as a team member 
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Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Structural Collapse Technician 
 
Skills to breach light frame structural components 
 
Skills to construct cribbing systems in a light frame collapsed structure 
 
Knowledge of heavy construction type structure and hazards and effects associated 
with structural collapse 
 
Ability to determine potential victim locations in a heavy construction type incident 
and establish search areas 
 
Ability to develop a collapse rescue incident action plan for a heavy collapsed 
structure 
 
Skills to implement a collapse rescue incident action plan for a heavy construction 
type collapsed structure  
 
Ability to implement an incident management system as applied to the search 
function of locating victims in a heavy construction type collapsed structure 
 
Skills to stabilize a collapsed heavy construction type structure 
 
Knowledge of resources and support resources for lighting, environmental control, 
and rescuer rehabilitation protocols 
 
Skills to release/remove a victim from entrapment of a heavy construction type 
collapse incident 
 
Skills to lift/move a heavy load as a team member 
 
Skills to breach heavy structural components 
 
Skills to construct cribbing systems in heavy construction type collapse 
 
Skills to cut through structural steel 
 
Ability to coordinate the use of heavy equipment utilizing safety protocols and 
establishing communications 
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3. Technical Search Specialist 
The technical search specialist curriculum is based on utilizing technology (i.e., 
listening devices, search cameras, and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking and 
navigation units) while performing technical searches (TEEX, 2009a).  The core 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for technical search specialist are listed in Table 5 
and obtained directly from the TEEX Disaster Technical Search Specialist TNG-11S 
Program of Instruction that references specific capabilities of Target Capabilities List 
(September 2007) and  critical task of Universal Task List (Version 2.1 issued May 23, 
2005) (TEEX, 2009b, pp. 6–9).  Core KSA define the capabilities and qualifications for 
the individual to function effectively in the role of technical search specialist and 
successfully accomplish missions they are tasked with. See Table 5 from Disaster 
Technical Search Specialist TNG-11S Program of Instruction. 
Table 5.   Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Technical Search Specialist (After 
TEEX, 2009b) 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Technical Search Specialist 
 
 
Knowledge of the Search and Rescue (SAR) planning process and operational 
briefings 
 
Ability to plan and coordinate Search and Rescue operations at the incident site 
 
Ability to direct Search and Rescue (SAR) resources according to the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS), and 
consensus-level technical rescue standards 
 
Skills to provide timely situational awareness and response information 
 
Ability to establish and maintain a chronological log of events in the field 
 
Skills to document and collect Search and Rescue operations information, including 
chronological log of event in the field for use in after action review 
 
Ability to access incident site to determine Search and Rescue course of action 
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Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Technical Search Specialist 
 
Ability to assess the incident site for hazardous materials and other environmental 
conditions 
 
Skills to develop map of search area to be used in Search and Rescue tactical 
operations 
 
Skills to communicate findings and recommend priorities to Team Management 
 
Ability to ensure scene/site safety (security, shoring, debris)  
 
Skills to conduct area search for victims 
 
Skills to search for victims using canine, physical, and electronic search capabilities 
 
Ability to identify and record potential/actual victim locations (live and dead) 
 
Skills to direct ambulatory victims to safe assembly point 
 
Skills to report progress of search efforts on a regular basis to Search and Rescue 
lead 
 
Ability to maintain accountability for search personnel, equipment, and supplies 
 
Skills to conduct Search and Rescue while continuing to assess situational needs 
 
Skills to conduct urban search and rescue operations 
 
Ability to direct search and rescue teams and collapse-site teams 
 
Skills to search and extract victims from site 
 
Skills to provide status reports on urban search and rescue operations 
 
Ability to provide care for rescuers, including the canine (K-9) first responders 
4. Confined Space Rescue 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA), for confined space rescue are 
listed in Table 6, and obtained directly from Chapter VII Confined Space Rescue, 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical Rescuer 
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Professional Qualifications 2008 Edition (NFPA, 2008a).  Core KSA define the 
capabilities and qualifications for the individual to function effectively in the role of 
confined space rescue and successfully accomplish missions they are tasked with.  It is 
further recommended that confined space rescuers have a general knowledge of Chapters 
IV and VII from NFPA 1670 Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Search 
and Rescue Incidents 2009 Edition, which is the standard for organizations providing 
response to technical search and rescue incidents (NFPA, 2009a).  See Table 6 taken 
from Chapter VII Confined Space Rescue, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
1006 Standard for Technical Rescuer Professional Qualifications 2008 Edition. 
Table 6.   Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Confines Space Rescue (After NFPA, 
2008a) 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Confined Space Rescue 
 
 
Knowledge of capabilities and limitations of detection and monitoring equipment 
and effects of ventilation in determining atmospheric conditions in a confined space  
 
Ability to operate monitoring equipment and perform rescuer pre-entry evaluations 
 
Skills to enter a confined space make contact with the victim and initiate patient 
care 
 
Skills to package a victim for removal from a confined space 
 
Skills to remove all entrants from a confined space, decontaminate as necessary, and 
deliver victims to emergency medical service providers 
 
Ability to preplan a confined space incident using supplied forms 
 
Skills to implement the confined space incident preplan 
 
Ability to control hazards—access to the incident scene is controlled and mitigate 
physical and atmospheric hazards 
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5. Trench Rescue 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for Trench Rescue are listed in 
Table 7, and obtained directly from Chapter 8 Trench Rescue, National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical Rescuer Professional Qualifications 
2008 Edition (NFPA, 2008a).  Core KSA define the capabilities and qualifications for the 
individual to function effectively in the role of trench rescuer and successfully 
accomplish missions they are tasked with.  It is further recommended that trench rescuers 
have a general knowledge of Chapters IV and XI from NFPA 1670 Standard on 
Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents 2009 Edition, which 
is the standard for organizations providing response to technical search and rescue 
incidents (NFPA, 2009a).  See Table 7, culled from Chapter 8 Trench Rescue, National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for Technical Rescuer Professional 
Qualifications 2008 Edition. 
Table 7.   Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Trench Rescue (After NFPA, 2008a) 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Trench Rescue 
 
 
Knowledge of methods to distinguish soil types, collapse mechanics, and other 
contributing environmental factors affecting trench rescue efforts 
 
Skills to implement a trench emergency action plan 
 
Skills to implement support resource operations at a trench emergency regarding 
lighting, dewatering techniques, atmospheric monitoring, and rescuer rehabilitation 
 
Ability to interpret tabulated data information and tables for placing shoring and 
shielding systems 
 
Skills to release/remove victim from a trench entrapment, package victim, initiate 
patient care while cognizant of extrication time 
 
Skills to disassemble support systems at a trench emergency incident, complete 




Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Trench Rescue 
 
Skills to support an intersecting trench as a member of a team with a rapid 
intervention team staged 
 
Skills to install supplemental sheeting and shoring below an existing approved 
shoring system with a rapid intervention team staged 
 
Ability to construct different types of load stabilization systems 
 
Skills to lift a load with the correct tools to meet the operational objectives 
 
Ability to coordinate the use of heavy equipment utilizing safety protocols and 
establishing a method of communication 
 
Skills to release a victim from entrapment of a collapsed trench without 
compromising the integrity of the existing trench shoring system 
F. COST OF TRAINING 
The cost of training urban search and rescue personnel can vary depending on 
where the class is held (locally versus out of town requiring a hotel stay and per diem 
allowances) and the number of people that need to be trained.  Along with the cost of all 
the required training for the class comes the associated cost of the backfill for the 
member that is attending urban search and rescue training.  Backfill is the replacement 
staffing cost for the vacant position the member attending school creates.  Backfill is 
calculated at an estimated overtime rate because the member usually staffing the vacant 
position is assigned to another shift and will exceed their normal hours worked during a 
pay period thus drawing overtime pay. 
DFR members attending urban search and rescue training are normally assigned 
to 24 hour shifts.  In most cases, it will be necessary to temporarily adjust the DFR 
members’ work schedule while they attend classes that are scheduled daily for the 
duration of the training course to complete the total number of hours required for the 
class.  When necessary, DFR places the member attending urban search and rescue 
courses on training leave in accordance with the procedures for Training Operations 
Personnel as stated in Dallas Fire-Rescue Manual of Procedures Volume 5 General 
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Procedures 2008 (DFR, 2008).  This allows members assigned to 24 hour shifts to 
receive 12-hours credit for each day spent in class (DFR, 2008, pp. 401–403).  This 
temporary work adjustment also determines the number of hours that must be paid in 
backfill because of the vacant position incurred at the fire station. For example, an 80-
hour class, scheduled for 10 days at eight hours per day, requires that each member be 
placed on training leave for a total of five 24-hour shifts.  This creates a vacant position at 
a fire station for five 24-hour shifts that backfill must be paid due to complying with DFR 
mandatory minimum staffing levels. 
In order to figure an accurate estimated cost for training urban search and rescue 
members in the five disciplines, DFR requires that a few substantial factors bear 
consideration, such as locating and selecting an accredited class with reasonable tuition 
rates and determining the number of individuals allowed to attend training at one time 
due to DFR daily mandatory staffing level requirements.  All of these factors will be 
taken into consideration in calculating the cost estimates in this research for the purpose 
of providing complete accuracy in determining the total cost of training urban search and 
rescue members in all five disciplines. 
Some standard rates that will be used to calculate cost for each urban search and 
rescue class is the backfill rate, mileage, lodging, and per diem rates.  According to an e-
mail from the DFR Financial Services Assistant Director, the actual hourly overtime rate 
for all ranks (fire and rescue officer, driver engineer, lieutenant, captain, or battalion 
chief) is $37.00.  However, the average backfill hourly rate includes figuring 27.5 percent 
for pension benefits [$37.00 x 27.5% = 10.175 + 37.00 = 47.175] which makes the 
current accurate backfill estimate $47.00 per hour.  The city of Dallas follows the 
standard mileage rates established by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  The current 
IRS standard mileage rate of 51 cents per mile will be used for estimating mileage 
reimbursement cost (IRS, 2010).  According to the City of Dallas Administrative 
Directive 4-7, maximum federal lodging, meal and incidental expense per diem rates will 




Publication 1542 (City of Dallas, 2004b).  The city uses the U.S. General Services 
Administration (GSA) website to locate the maximum rates allowed for the destination of 
the traveler (City of Dallas, 2004b). 
The Rope Rescue Technician level course found locally is 80 hours in length for 
two weeks at 10 hours per day with 96 hours to backfill at the station. The mileage 
estimate used for Table 8 will be calculated from the DFR Training Academy to the 
location of the scheduled Rope Rescue Technician course (Tarrant County College Fire 
Service Training Center, n.d.a). 
Table 8.   Cost for Training a Rope Rescue Technician 
  





























The Structural Collapse Technician course is located out-of-town, 80 hours in 
length for eight consecutive days at 10 hours per day with 96 hours of backfill at the 
station.  The mileage estimate used for Table 9 will be calculated from the DFR Training 
Academy to the location of the scheduled Structural Collapse Technician course (TEEX, 
n.d.b). 
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The Technical Search Specialist course is located out-of-town, 40 hours in length 
for five days at eight hours per day with 60 hours of backfill at the station.  The mileage 
estimate for Table 10 will be calculated from the DFR Training Academy to the location 
of the scheduled Technical Search Specialist course (TEEX, n.d.c). 












































The Confined Space Rescue course found locally is 40 hours in length for four 
consecutive days at 10 hours per day with 48 hours to backfill at the station. The mileage 
 52 
estimate used for Table 11 will be calculated from the DFR Training Academy to the 
location of the scheduled Confined Space Rescue course (Tarrant County College Fire 
Service Training Center, n.d.a). 
































The Trench Rescue course found locally is 50 hours in length for one week at 10 
hours per day with 60 hours to backfill at the station. The mileage estimate used for Table 
12 will be calculated from the DFR Training Academy to the location of the scheduled 
Confined Space Rescue course (Tarrant County College Fire Service Training Center, 
n.d.a). 
Table 12.   Cost for Trench Rescue Course 
  































The research for the individual cost of each urban search and rescue discipline is 
compiled in Table 13 to reflect the total cost of $25,630.83 for training one Dallas Fire-
Rescue member in the five disciplines necessary for urban search and rescue.  See Table 
13. 
Table 13.   Total Cost of Entire Training for an Urban Search & Rescue Member 
 
Dallas Fire-Rescue Urban Search and 
Rescue  
Five (5) Disciplines  
 
 
Total Cost for Training one (1) person 
per Discipline 
 

























Total Cost for Training one (1) 
Urban Search and Rescue 







G. EVALUATION OF URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAM HOMELAND 
SECURITY ROLE 
As the nation continues to plan for preventing and interdicting terrorists’ attacks 




despite our resiliency in preparedness methods.  In the unfortunate case we are 
unsuccessful in preventing a terrorist attack, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(2007) states: 
Given the certainty of catastrophes on our soil—no matter how 
unprecedented or extraordinary—it is our collective duty to provide the 
best response possible.  When needed, we will bring to bear the Nation’s 
full capabilities and resources to save lives, mitigate suffering, and protect 
property.  As the Nation responds based on the scope and nature of the 
incident, we must begin to lay the foundation not only for a strong 
recovery over the short term but also for the rebuilding and revitalization 
of affected communities and regions over the long term.  This is crucial to 
reducing the psychological, social and economic effects of an incident.  
Ultimately response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts are tightly 
intertwined, each tapping into the resilience of the American spirit and our 
determination to endure and become stronger in the face of adversity. 
(DHS, 2007b, p. 31) 
Fire service urban search and rescue teams will provide the best response possible 
to the community with their enhanced capabilities and flexibility for adjusting to 
extraordinary catastrophic events by being able to react to the potential threat of fire, 
those that are on fire, or those without the threat of fire (Norman, 2009, p. 4).  As urban 
search and rescue teams respond and rescue victims, they will be laying the foundation 
for short and long-term recovery by rapidly developing an operational plan and moving 
through the time-sensitive phases of search and rescue.  Once an area is cleared of 
victims, rescuers will collaborate with law enforcement to release the area for overhaul 
and clean-up. 
Urban search and rescue teams become so close (physically and emotionally) to a 
catastrophic event, they develop a keen perspective and can understand and sense what 
the victims are feeling and enduring emotionally.  Rescuers literally become a lifeline not 
only physically, but emotionally for the victims they are rescuing.  During the process of 
working to extricate victims, rescuers wind up by default offering positive support and 
reinforcement to constantly calm the victims while monitoring their physical health.  This 
in turn allows urban search and rescue teams an opportunity to assist victims emotionally 
by offering a foundation of support in prioritizing and bringing a sense of order to the 
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chaos happening around them.  Urban search and rescue teams are not trained to 
administer psychological first aid (PSA), but they are familiar with the symptoms of 
distress due to traumatic events.  Rescuers can immediately alert mental health 
professional to a victim or first responder in need of psychological first aid.  While fire 
service urban search and rescue teams are intertwined in a reactive phase of the incident, 
they are assisting mental health professionals in a proactive phase of protecting the 
mental health of the community, thus lessening the impact of the disaster and moving the 
stricken community forward toward revitalization. 
According to Homeland Security Directive 8: National Preparedness, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security was directed to ―ensure the preparedness of the Nation to 
prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters and other emergencies‖ by developing ―a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal‖ (DHS, 2008a).  The Secretary accomplished this mandate by 
releasing the National Preparedness Guidelines in September 2007.  One purpose of the 
National Preparedness Guidelines is to ―incorporate lessons learned from past disasters 
into national preparedness priorities‖ (DHS, 2007a, p. 1).  There is no doubt that the 
lessons learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and Hurricane Katrina have 
solidified the preparedness priorities of urban search and rescue teams’ response 
capabilities (DHS, 2007a, p. iii). Urban search and rescue teams are listed in the National 
Preparedness Guidelines as a capability for the response mission area with the 
conclusion being during time-sensitive disasters rescuers will rescue a large number of 
victims, render medical treatment, and maintain rescuer safety (2007a).  
Urban search and rescue members are dedicated to the mission of rescue as stated 
in The National Preparedness Guidelines because they are comprised of members that 
have volunteered for search and rescue training in addition to their firefighting duties 
(DHS, 2007a).  They have devoted numerous hours attending advanced technical courses 
and continuing education training to achieve a higher level of knowledge, skills, and 
abilities to ultimately provide the best response possible.  Fire service urban search and 
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rescue members are dedicated because they want to be, and when people want to be part 
of the mission, there is no further justification needed because they will remain resolute 
and committed to success. 
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IV. DALLAS FIRE-RESCUE (DFR) EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE 
DISPOSAL (EOD) TEAM 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team is to render 
safe and/or remove any type of suspected or confirmed improvised, incendiary or 
chemical explosive devices, pyrotechnics, and ammunition (Homeland Security and 
Operations Division, 2009, p. 1).  Members of the EOD Team are responsible for 
investigating threats, incidents, or related incidents of accidental or intentional 
explosions, bombings, fire bombings, pyrotechnics, ammunition, as well as any device 
found that could be or potentially be a bomb (Homeland Security and Operations 
Division, 2009, pp. 4–5). 
B. ORGANIZATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TEAM 
On April 22, 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) granted approval for 
the Dallas Police Department (DPD) to relinquished control of the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) Team and transfer the responsibilities to Dallas Fire-Rescue according to 
a Dallas Fire-Rescue (DFR) 2009 Departmental Memorandum #34, dated May 29, 2009.  
The DFR 2009 Departmental Memorandum #34, further states, ―The DPD members who 
are currently staffing the Bomb Squad will be assigned to Dallas Fire-Rescue until they 
promote, retire or are reassigned, however all future Bomb Technicians will come from 
DFD‖ [both Dallas Fire Department (DFD) and Dallas Fire-Rescue (DFR) are terms used 
interchangeably].  Staffing for Dallas Fire-Rescue Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team is 
four full-time Dallas Police Department bomb technicians that originally transferred to 
Dallas Fire-Rescue with the team.   
An attachment included with 2009 Departmental Memorandum #34 depicts the 
Bomb Squad Transition Plan in three separate phases: 
 Phase I, August 2008: August 2009, four Dallas Police bomb technicians 
will staff the EOD Team for eight hours per day and will be on call after 
hours 
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 Phase II, June 2009: December 2010, six Dallas Fire-Rescue bomb 
technicians complete training at the Hazardous Device School (HDS), will 
staff the EOD Team in eight hour shifts 24 hours per day 
 Phase III, December 2010: December 2013, Dallas Fire-Rescue maintains 
eight to 12 bomb technicians through attrition, promotion, and training, 
will staff the EOD Team twenty-four (24) hours a day per 2009 
Departmental Memorandum #34. 
The Bomb Squad Transition plan above will require all members in the future be 
trained as: 
 Bomb technicians 
 Hazardous materials technicians 
 Police officers 
 Arson investigators 
As of February 2011, one section chief assigned to Dallas Fire-Rescue Arson 
Investigation Division has completed Hazardous Devices School (HDS). 
The current staffing for the full-time EOD Team is comprised of one Dallas 
Police Sergeant who serves as the team supervisor and three Dallas Police 
investigator/bomb technicians (Homeland Security and Operations Division, 2009, p. 3).  
Their daily work hours are 0800 to 1700, and after hours they follow a monthly duty 
roster to ensure a proper response to all bomb calls (Homeland Security and Operations 
Division, 2009, p. 5).  An EOD Team response requires a minimum staffing of two bomb 
technicians with essential safety equipment (Homeland Security and Operations Division, 
2009). 
It is noteworthy to acknowledge that approximately 10 percent of bomb squads 
reside in the fire service (Cox, 2004).  Most bomb squads, including the first formal one 
assembled in the United States, the New York Police Department (NYPD) Bomb Squad, 
are under the direction of law enforcement (Cox, 2004). 
C. CAPABILITIES 
Presently the capabilities of the Explosive Ordnance Team is responding to 
threats, potential or actual incidents regarding all types of incendiary devices, explosives, 
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or bombings within the city of Dallas or the 16-county region (i.e., Collin, Dallas, 
Denton, Ellis, Erath, Hood, Hunt, Johnson, Kaufman, Navarro, Palo Pinto, Parker, 
Rockwall, Somervell, Tarrant, and Wise counties) as defined by the North Central Texas 
Council of Governments (NCTCOG)  (Homeland Security and Operations Division, 
2009, p. 14).  Other capabilities include:   
 Proper safe and legal transportation, storage, and disposal of explosives 
and hazardous devices  
 Collecting and preserving evidence 
 Submitting prosecution reports to the proper authority 
 Conducting initial, follow-up, or joint investigations of all explosive/bomb 
related threats or events 
 Providing dignitary protection when warranted (Homeland Security and 
Operations Division, 2009). 
If the above Bomb Squad Transition Plan delineated in Dallas Fire-Rescue 2009 
Departmental Memorandum #34 is actualized, the Explosive Ordnance Team will have 
the additional capabilities and responsibilities of investigating and determining all fire 
causes in the city of Dallas. These additional duties will entail automatic emergency 
responses to all multiple alarm fires or when a special request is made by an incident 
commander and when directed to do so by fire dispatch (DFR, 2003).  The bomb 
technician/arson investigator will immediately respond to fires involving fatalities, 
serious burn victims, and when requested by the Dallas Police Department for criminal 
activity involving fire (DFR, 2003).  The bomb technician/arson investigator trained 
police officer will have the authority to investigate, gather evidence, arrest suspects, and 
testify in court concerning incidents they have participated in (DFR, 2003). 
D. STANDARDS FOR CURRICULUMS 
Bomb Technicians, arson investigators, hazardous materials technicians, and 
police officers are independent noble career paths and are viewed that way by law 
enforcement and fire service professionals.  However, Dallas Fire-Rescue is on a course 
of transforming one profession into a multi-dimensional career path with the current 
Bomb Squad Transition Plan. 
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This type of jack-of-all-trades, master of no particular discipline defies the 
approach and emphasis necessary in training individuals to advanced levels for special 
operations explosive ordnance disposal missions.  Bomb incidents are low frequency 
events and the amount of time a bomb technician spends training is as important as the 
time police officers, arson investigators, and hazardous materials technicians spend 
benefiting from the experience acquired in responding to and participating in copious 
actual incidents.  The passage below, taken from Bomb Squad A Year Inside the Nation's 
Most Exclusive Police Unit (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007), highlights the seriousness of 
every bomb technician truly being prepared to go down range and work on a device. 
The bomb technician, like other highly skilled mechanics—
microsurgeons, test pilots, Formula One race car mechanics, or 
astronauts—is completely focused on his field.  Practice is second nature.  
Reading technical journals is a steady activity.  Reviewing each bomb that 
explodes anywhere in the world is the subject of daily squad discussion.  
Duplicating and disarming the most interesting devices goes without 
saying.  Testing new tools; improving techniques; attending seminars on 
robot handling, disruption techniques, large vehicle bombs, booby traps, 
and the use of various kinds of detonators and explosives are the subjects 
of schedules posted on a chalkboard.  The board also includes notices and 
sign-up lists for training with other units in the Police Department and 
with bombs squads in neighboring jurisdictions.  Bomb technicians work 
in teams, and those teams have to be as smooth and efficient as a 
NASCAR pit crew. (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007, p. 58) 
E. BOMB TECHNICIANS 
The standards for Explosive Ordnance Disposal members (bomb technicians) 
curriculum is mandated by the U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in law enforcement sensitive document National Guidelines for Bomb 
Technicians.  The National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB), a 
standing committee of 12 elected bomb squad commanders from four national regions, 
serving three-year terms, has the final authority on explosive ordnance disposal teams 
guidelines and standards (National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisor Board 
[NBSCAB], n.d.a). 
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NBSCAB works collaboratively with the Hazardous Devices School (HDS), 
located at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, (where bomb technicians are 
trained) to establish a national criteria for bomb technician certification as well as an 
accreditation process for bomb squads (NBSCAB, n.d.b).  By reason of NBSCAB 
analysis and recommendations all bomb technician candidates must successfully 
complete the prerequisite of hazardous materials technician training prior to selection for 
admission to Hazardous Devices School (NBSCAB, n.d.b). 
Dallas Fire-Rescue bomb technicians complete a minimum of 40 hours continuing 
education annually and a minimum of 16 hours practical exercise/training monthly in 
order to remain in compliance with the national guidelines (Homeland Security and 
Operations Division, 2009, p. 7).  Most continuing education and practical 
exercise/training hours are accomplished during regular scheduled work hours. 
F. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TECHNICIAN 
The Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) is the regulatory authority that 
enforces statewide fire service standards and provides education and assistance to the fire 
service as defined by Chapter 419 of the Texas Government Code (TCFP, 2010b).  In the 
state of Texas, certification with the TCFP is mandatory for paid fire protection personnel 
to ensure the safety of fire personnel and compliance of fire departments with state laws 
and regulations (TCFP, 2007a). 
The TCFP provides the certification curriculum for hazardous materials 
technicians in Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter Six Hazardous Materials NFPA 
472, 2008 Edition, Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP, 2010a).  The TCFP 
curriculum follows practically verbatim Chapter VII, Competencies for Hazardous 
Materials Technicians in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 472 Standard 
for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Incidents, 2008 Edition (NFPA, 2008b).  Clearly NFPA 472 is the crux for hazardous 
materials technician training and education. 
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Continuing education (CE) hours are required annually by the Texas Commission 
on Fire Protection so as to keep Dallas Fire-Rescue personnel certifications active and the 
department in compliance with all TCFP rules.  The TCFP requires a minimum of 10 
hours continuing education for hazardous materials technicians (TCFP, n.d.b).  Most of 
the continuing education training hours are accomplished during regular on-duty work 
hours. 
G. FIRE/ARSON INVESTIGATOR 
The TCFP provides the certification curriculum for fire investigators in 
Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter Five Fire Investigator, 2007 Edition (TCFP, 
2007b).  The nexus for the fire investigator curriculum include National Fire Protection 
Association standards:  
 NFPA 472 Standard for Competence of Responder to Hazardous 
Materials Incidents, 2002 Edition 
 NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 2004 Edition 
 NFPA 1033 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire 
Investigator, 2003 Edition  
A portion of the curriculum emphasizes laws and statutes of which the fire 
investigator is required to have a respectable knowledge.  A fire investigator does not 
have the authority to enforce laws unless a law enforcement commission certification is 
obtained (TCFP, 2007b). 
There is no prerequisite to hold a peace officer certification for admission into the 
Texas Commission on fire protection/fire investigator training.  Upon successful 
completion of fire investigator training, a person will be awarded certification as a fire 
investigator.  If a fire investigator desires or the agency, such as Dallas Fire-Rescue, 
requires that fire investigators have the authority to investigate arson fires, then the fire 
investigator must obtain a law enforcement commission certification.  Minimum 
standards for arson investigator certification is stated in the Standards Manual for Fire 
Protection Personnel (TCFP, 2006): 
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Chapter 431 Fire Investigation, Subchapter A Minimum Standards for Arson 
Investigator Certification, 431.11 Minimum Standards for Arson Investigator 
Certification for Law Enforcement Personnel states: 
 A law enforcement officer employed or commissioned by a law 
enforcement agency as a peace officer who is designated as an arson 
investigator by an appropriate local authority is eligible for certification on 
a voluntary basis by complying with this chapter. 
 An individual holding commission certification as a fire investigator who 
becomes a law enforcement officer employed or commissioned by a law 
enforcement agency as a peace officer, and who is designated as an arson 
investigator by an appropriate local authority will qualify for a similar 
level arson investigator certificate.  To obtain a printed certificate the 
individual must make application to the commission to include 
confirmation of commission. (TCFP, 2006) 
The Texas Commission on Fire Protection requires a minimum of 20 hours 
continuing education for fire investigators (TCFP, n.d.b).  Most of the continuing 
education training hours are accomplished during regular on-duty work hours. 
H. FIRE SERVICE IFSAC SEAL 
The International Fire Service Accreditation Congress (IFSAC) is a non-profit 
peer-driven organization authorized by the Board of Regents of Oklahoma State 
University that accredits fire service certification programs and higher education fire-
related degree programs (IFSAC, 2010).  The goal of this governing body is to increase 
the level of professionalism in the fire service by verifying that participating programs 
are adhering to nationally recognized standards such as the National Fire Protection 
Association Standards (IFSAC, 2005, pp. 1–3).  IFSAC has reviewed, approved, and 
accredited the Texas Commission on Fire Protection’s hazardous materials technician and 
fire investigation certification program (TCFP, n.d.a).  The IFSAC seal can be obtained 
voluntarily for a small fee after an individual has successfully completed and met the 
requirements for Texas Commission on Fire Protection hazardous materials technician or 
fire investigator (TCFP, n.d.a).  The benefit of an IFSAC seal signifies one as being 
trained to higher nationally recognized standards (TCFP, n.d.a). 
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I. POLICE OFFICERS 
Texas law enforcement standards for police officers are established by the Texas 
Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education (TCLEOSE) for 
improving law enforcement proficiency and professionalism (Texas Commission on Law 
Enforcement Officer Standards and Education [TCLEOSE], 2009a). TCLEOSE is 
governed by nine commissioners appointed by the governor of the state of Texas for 
staggered six year terms (2009a).  The TCLEOSE Commission is empowered by 
legislation to enact minimum law enforcement standards  in accordance with the Texas 
Occupations Code Section 1701.151, General Powers of Commission; Rulemaking 
Authority,(2):  ―Establish minimum standards relating to competence and reliability, 
including education, training, mental, and moral standards, for licensing as an officer, 
county jailer, or public security officer;‖ in addition to other responsibilities (TCLEOSE, 
2009a).  
Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education 
requires that police officers complete 40 hours of continuing education in a 24 month 
training cycle stipulated by TCLEOSE (TCLEOSE, 2009b).  Normally, Dallas Fire-
Rescue arson investigators complete the required continuing education hours during 
regular on-duty hours. 
J. CORE KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITIES 
1. Bomb Technicians 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA), for bomb technicians are listed in 
Table 14 and obtained directly from the Hazardous Devices Course Curriculum but 
designed in a generic format to avoid divulging sensitive information (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Bomb Data Center, n.d.).  Core KSA define the capabilities and 
qualifications for the individual to function effectively in the role of a bomb technician 
and successfully accomplish missions they are tasked with.  See Table 14 Hazardous 
Devices Course Curriculum. 
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Table 14.   Core Knowledge, Skill, and Abilities for Bomb Technicians (After Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Bomb Data Center, n.d.) 
Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Bomb Technicians 
 
 
Knowledge of types of improvised explosive devices 
 
Skills to employ render safe procedures on explosive devices 
 
Ability to determine and apply hand entry actions 
 
Ability to apply logical procedures utilizing Electronic Counter Measures when 
necessary 
 
Ability to safely and effectively conduct routine demolition procedures 
 
Knowledge of types of electrical hazards and effects during demolition operations 
 
Knowledge of types of X-ray equipment 
 
Skills to safely operate X-ray equipment 
 
Ability to interpret X-rays of components and devices 
 
Knowledge of EOD robots, their capabilities, and priority of use 
 
Skills to operate EOD robots and successfully complete specific tasks 
 
Knowledge of effects of an explosion on bomb components 
 
Ability to identify bomb components after detonation 
 
Skills to employ protective measures and protective works 
 
Knowledge of types of equipment of for transporting hazardous devices 
 
Ability to safely plan the transportation of an explosive device 
 
Skills to appropriately transport an explosive device 
 
Knowledge of considerations and factors of rigging system operations 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Bomb Technicians 
 
Ability to identify rigging and line techniques used during semi-remote procedures 
 
Skills to employ semi-remote procedures 
 
Knowledge of legal issues affecting bomb technicians 
 
Ability to document information relevant to bombing investigations 
 
Knowledge of principles regarding safe storage of explosives 
 
Knowledge of the threat of bioterrorism and biological agents 
 
Ability to identify Weapons of Mass (WMD) devices 
 
Ability to identify chemical agents, hazards, effects of agents, and first aid 
procedures 
 
Ability to identify military ordnance and follow through with the proper reporting 
procedures 
 
Ability to identify nuclear material/hazards, nuclear devices, protective measures, 
and radiation monitoring techniques 
 
Ability to identify improvised explosives and incendiaries 
 
Knowledge of conventional explosives, explosive classes, types of explosives 
 
Knowledge of military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) response 
 
Skills to don protective equipment and complete specific tasks 
 
Ability to preplan bomb threat and search procedures 
 
Skill to safely actualize the bomb threat and search procedures 
 




Knowledge of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) history, 
components, dynamic disruption considerations 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Bomb Technicians 
 
 
Ability to conduct situational analysis and vehicle evaluation of Vehicle Borne 
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) 
 
Skills to defeat Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) 
 
Ability to identify improvised mortars and projected weapons 
 
Ability to demonstrate situational analysis and apply Logic Tree application for 
render safe techniques 
 
Ability to demonstrate risk assessment and apply to render safe techniques 
 
Knowledge and familiarity of safe disposal procedures and directives 
 
Skills to perform safe disposal procedures using detonation and burning techniques 
 
Ability to identify and special purpose tools and capabilities 
 
Skills to demonstrate remote entry procedures 
 
Knowledge of Percussion Actuated Non-electric (PAN) disrupter capabilities 
 
Skills to utilize PAN and render safe Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) 
 
Knowledge of Suicide Bombers and their modus operandi  
 
Ability to evaluate and conduct situational awareness of Suicide Bombings 
 
Ability to determine uses of remote entry along with advantages and disadvantages 
 
Knowledge and uses of mechanical action fuzes, clocks, and timer application to 
hazardous devices 
 
Knowledge of DC electricity applications to hazardous devices 
2. Hazardous Materials Technician 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for hazardous materials 
technicians are listed in Table 15 and obtained directly from NFPA 472 Standard for 
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Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Incidents (NFPA, 2008b) and Section 604 of Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter 
Six Hazardous Materials NFPA 472, 2008 Edition, Texas Commission on Fire Protection 
(TCFP, 2010a).  Core KSA define the capabilities and qualifications for the individual to 
function effectively in the role of a hazardous materials technician and successfully 
accomplish missions they are tasked with.  See Table 15 NFPA 472 Standard for 
Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Incidents (After NFPA, 2008b) and Section 604 of Certification Curriculum Manual, 
Chapter Six Hazardous Materials NFPA 472, 2008 Edition. 
Table 15.   Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Hazardous Materials 
Technicians (After TCFP, 2010a) 




General knowledge of laws, regulations, and national standards 
 
Ability to analyze the hazardous materials/WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 
incident to determine complexity of problems and potential outcomes 
 
Skills to survey the hazardous materials/WMD incident to indentify special 
containers, storage tanks, railroad cars, non-bulk packaging, and radioactive 
packaging; indentify or classify unknown hazardous materials; verify the presence 
and concentrations of hazardous materials through the use of instrumentation, 
detection and monitoring equipment 
 
Skills to collect and interpret hazard and response information from printed and 
technical resources, computer databases, and monitoring equipment 
 
Ability to describe the condition of the container involved in the incident and assess 
the level of risk associated with the damage 
 
Ability to predict the likely behavior of released materials and their containers with 
multiple materials involved 
 
Ability to estimate the likely size of an endangered area 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Hazardous Materials 
Technicians 
 
Ability to plan a response within the capabilities of available personnel, defining 
objectives, potential options, and selecting proper personnel protective equipment 
 
Ability to select a technical decontamination process to minimize the hazard 
 
Ability to develop a plan of action for hazardous materials/WMD incident 
 
Skills to implement the planned response to favorably change the outcome  
 
Skills to perform the incident command duties within the local incident 
management system  
 
Skills to don and effectively function in protective clothing and respiratory 
protection 
 
Skills to perform control functions identified in the Incident Action Plan (IAP) 
 
Skills to perform decontamination functions identified in the Incident Action Plan 
(IAP) 
 
Ability to evaluate the progress of the hazardous materials incident/WMD 
concerning the effectiveness of the control functions and decontamination process 
 
Knowledge to terminate the hazardous materials/WMD incident 
 
Knowledge to assist in the incident debriefing and incident critique 
 
Skills to provide reports and documentation of the hazardous materials/WMD 
incident 
 
3. Fire Investigator 
The core knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for fire investigators are listed in 
Table 16 and obtained directly from Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter Five Fire 
Investigator, 2007 Edition, Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP, 2007b).  Core 
KSA define the capabilities and qualifications for the individual to function effectively in 
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the role of fire investigator and successfully accomplish missions they are tasked with.  
See Table 16 Certification Curriculum Manual, Chapter Five Fire Investigator, 2007 
Edition, Texas Commission on Fire Protection.  
Table 16.   Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigator (After TCFP, 
2007b) 
Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
 
Knowledge of NFPA Standards 1033 and 921 applicable to Fire Investigators 
 
Knowledge of rules applicable to Arson Investigators certification per Texas 
Commission on Fire Protection 
 
Ability to describe the nature of fire investigations utilizing the systematic approach 
of the scientific method 
 
Ability to describe the process of combustion and associated fire science key terms 
 
Knowledge and ability to define/describe fire theory 
 
Skills to identify heat energy sources 
 
Knowledge and ability to define/describe methods of heat transfer 
 
Ability to describe the conditions necessary for ignition of different types of fuel 
 
Ability to describe the effects of fuel load fire development 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe fire development  
 
Knowledge and ability to define/describe the characteristics of fuels 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the characteristics of flammable and 
combustible liquids 
 
Skills to identify characteristics of oxidizers, plastics, and combustible metals 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe basic classifications of building construction 
and the general fire behavior expected for each type of construction 
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Ability to describe the different methods of frame construction and the fire 
protection concerns associated with each 
 
Ability to describe the different types of alternative residential construction and fire 
protection concerns associated with each  
 
Ability to describe the effects of fire and fire suppression activities on common 
building materials 
 
Skills to identify fire spread characteristics of interior finishes 
 
Skills to identify different types of wall/partitions and their characteristics as related 
to fire spread 
 
Skills to identify construction assemblies and their characteristics as related to fire 
spread 
 
Ability to describe building systems components and their relation to smoke and fire 
spread 
 
Ability to describe the types and characteristics of automatic sprinkler systems 
 
Ability to describe the types, operations, capabilities and the effects of the proper 
application of special agent fire extinguishing systems 
 
Skills to identify the classes and capabilities of standpipe and hose systems 
 
Skills to identify alarm-initiating devices 
 
Skills to identify fire detection systems 
 
Ability to describe Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system 
components and their relation to smoke and fire spread 
 
Knowledge and skills to recognize, identify, and properly analyze fire patterns   
 
Skills to identify and interpret charring 
 
Skills to identify and interpret characteristics of spalling 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
 
Ability to define oxidation and the effects of oxidation 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the effects of heat on common materials 
 
Ability to describe thermal expansion and deformation of materials 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe:  smoke and soot, clean burn, and calcinations 
 
Ability to describe the effects of fire on window glass 
 
Skills to identify and interpret burn patterns on collapsed furniture springs 
 
Skills to identify certain types of burn patterns used to locate the positions of objects 
as they were during a fire 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe locations of fire patterns and various fire 
patterns 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe linear fire patterns and area fire patterns 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe material distortion 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe general considerations of human response to 
fires 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the factors related to fire initiation 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe human factors related to fire spread 
 
Knowledge to ensure that constitutional considerations are observed and landmark 
legal cases relating to fire investigation 
 
Ability to identify laws and procedures relating to “right of entry” 
 
Knowledge of laws and procedures relating to evidence 
 




Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
Ability to identify laws relating to the reporting of arson statutes and the basic 
reasons for civil litigation as it pertains to fire investigation 
 
Ability to identify legal requirements for expert testimony 
 
Ability to identify sources of information and assistance available to the Investigator 
during a fire investigation 
 
Ability to identify government and private sources of information useful during a 
fire investigation 
 
Skills to identify basic information necessary to plan and conduct an investigation 
and identify the goals of a pre-investigation team meeting 
 
Ability and skills to perform and document an interview 
 
Ability and skills to document the investigation of the fire scene 
 
Ability and skills to define types of evidence and the purposes for submitting items 
for analysis 
 
Knowledge and ability to describe methods of preserving and protecting the fire 
scene and evidence 
 
Knowledge and ability to describe contamination of containers and evidence 
 
Knowledge and ability to describe methods of colleting physical evidence, including 
types, capabilities and limitations of standard and special tools 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the evidence chain of custody, methods of 
documentation, and proper methods of transporting evidence 
 
Skills to identify types of evidence of analytical methods and tests applicable to 
certain fire investigations, and the capabilities and limitations of the services that 
perform the analysis 
 
Knowledge of the proper procedure for evidence disposition 
 
Knowledge of death scene considerations 
 
Skills to identify individuals to be notified and involved in a fatality fire 
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Skill to identify other possible related crimes associated with fatality fires 
 
Ability to describe the documentation procedure related to the recovery of bodies 
and evidence 
 
Ability to describe death-related pathological and toxicological examinations 
 
Ability to describe the effects of consumption of the body by fire 
 
Ability to describe the fundamental issues of death investigations, mechanism of 
death, and postmortem tests and documentation 
 
Ability to describe fire and explosion injuries, medical evidence of burns, medical 
evidence of inhalation injuries and mechanism of inhalation injuries 
 
Knowledge of hospital tests, documentation and access to medical evidence 
 
Knowledge of safety issues as they relate to the Fire Investigator regarding on scene 
safety 
 
Knowledge of NFPA Standard 472 applicable to Hazardous Materials incident 
management and response 
 
 
Knowledge and skills to identify hazardous classes or divisions and the primary 
hazards associated with the class or division 
 
Skills to identify typical occupancies and locations where hazardous materials may 
be manufactured, transported, stored, used or disposed  
 
Skills to identify specialized marking systems found at fixed facilities and a placard 
on mode of transportation that indicated hazardous materials 
 
Knowledge of material safety data sheets (MSDS) and shipping papers that 
indicates hazardous materials 
 
Skills to identify clues (other than obvious container markings, location, container 
shape, shipping papers) that use the senses of sight, sound, and odor to indicate 
hazardous materials 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
 
Knowledge and skills to identify locations that could become targets for criminal or 
terrorist activity using hazardous materials 
 
Knowledge of the difference between a chemical and biological incident 
 
Skill to utilize the Emergency Response Guidebook 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the proper method of conducting a 
preliminary scene assessment 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the purpose for examining the surrounding 
areas of a fire scene 
 
Skills to identify items to be noted during the exterior and interior examination of 
the building 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the importance of burn patterns interpretation 
as it relates to areas of origin 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the importance of interpretation of low burns 
and their relationship to the point of origin 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the effects of fire attack, ventilation, salvage, 
and overhaul as they relate to point of origin determination 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe responsibilities of fire suppression personnel 
related to fire investigations 
 
Knowledge and skill to define/identify the purpose of fire scene reconstruction 
 
Skills to identify the method for examining a total burn structure 
 
Knowledge to define fire cause 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the process of elimination 
 
Ability to describe the source and form of heat for ignition 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the first material ignited 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
Ability to determine the ignition source 
 
Skills to formulate an opinion of fire cause that will withstand the challenge of 
reasonable examination 
 
Ability to describe methods for analyzing the incident for cause and responsibility 
 
Ability to describe the causes of fires or explosions, causes of damage to property, 
and the causes of bodily injury or loss of life 
 
Ability to describe the determination of responsibility, failure analysis and 
analytical tools, timelines for use in analyzing fire cause, system analysis techniques, 
purpose for mathematical modeling, and the role of fire testing 
 
Knowledge of various types of explosions 
 
Ability to describe the characteristics of explosion damage 
 
Ability to describe the procedures for investigation, security and safety 
considerations at an explosion scene 
 
Ability to describe procedures used to conduct a post blast investigation 
 
Knowledge and ability to explain electrical theory and indicators of damage to 
electrical systems 
 
Knowledge to define “accidental” fires 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe typical causes of accidental fires 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe product liability and duties of the 
manufacturer 
 
Skills to identify damaged products 
 
Knowledge of procedures for securing, storing and disposal of damaged products or 
evidence 
 
Knowledge to define “incendiary” fires 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe indicators of “incendiary” fires 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the safe handling procedures when any 
inactivated incendiary device is discovered 
 
Skills and ability to identify/explain potential indicators of incendiary fires not 
directly related to combustion 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe other evidentiary factors associated with 
incendiary fires 
 
Ability to identify types of motives common to incendiary fire investigation, methods 
used to discover opportunity and understanding human behavioral patterns relative 
to fire setting 
 
Skills to identify sources of information relating to vehicles and their operations 
 
Skills to identify safety considerations for conducting motor vehicle examinations 
 
Skills to identify common materials serving as fuels and common ignition sources 
found in motor vehicle fires 
 
Ability to describe the proper method of examining motor vehicle systems 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe procedures of recording motor vehicle fire 
scenes 
 
Skills to identify information to be obtained for the owner/operator and witnesses to 
establish a vehicle fire scene history 
 
Skills to identify the benefits of examining vehicle particulars and the method of 
recording the motor vehicle fire scene 
 
Skills to identify items unique to special circumstances involving motor vehicle fires 
 
Skills to identify agencies that provide technical assistance and expertise related to 
wildfires 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe flammability analysis of wildfire fuels and 
factors affecting wildfire spread 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe/interpret indicators used in determining the 
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Core Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Fire Investigators 
 
direction of travel of a wildfire 
 
Skills to identify methods of conducting an origin investigation of a wildfire 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the importance of security of the area or point 
of origin of a wildfire 
 
Ability to identify causes of wildfires 
 
Skills to identify special safety considerations associated with investigation of 
wildfires 
 
Ability to manage major investigations and coordinate actions of different parties 
 
Skills and ability to identify/describe the components of managing a major 
investigation 
 
Ability to identify the purpose of the post-scene analysis 
 
Ability to describe the purpose of collecting and organizing investigative material, 
the purpose of review and evaluation of investigative material, and the types of data 
regarding a fire loss problem and their use in developing public informational 
presentations 
4. Police Officer  
The review of law enforcement curriculum for developing the core knowledge, 
skills, and abilities is incommensurate for this research and concentration on fire service 
special operations teams.  There is no requirement for a bomb technician or fire 
investigator to hold a law enforcement commission.  However, the cost of training and 
training hours will be relevant to factor in the overall expense of the Dallas Fire-Rescue 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team because of the agency requirement. 
K. COST OF TRAINING 
The cost of training a Dallas Fire-Rescue bomb technician will not have the 
budgetary impact of paying backfill (replacement staffing cost) for the vacant position the 
member attending school creates.  Approximately three members assigned to 40-hour 
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work week staff assignments have been selected for explosive ordnance disposal training.  
No minimum staffing requirement is necessary to backfill a staff assignment or pay 
overtime, so the practice within Dallas Fire-Rescue has been to temporarily maintain the 
vacant position until the member returns from training. 
1. Hazardous Device School 
Hazardous Device School (HDS) is located in Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, 
Alabama.  There are no tuition fees for Hazardous Device School courses (Jernigan, 
2006).  The basic course is six weeks in length and cost will be incurred for air travel, 
lodging, rental car, and per diem, which will be estimated following financial policies and 
procedures via the City of Dallas Administrative Directive 4-7, Travel on City Business, 
and factored into the overall cost of training one person as a bomb technician (City of 
Dallas, 2004b).  After the justification is written for the person attending Hazardous 
Devices School and approved by the proper city official, airline tickets and rental car 
arrangements will be secured by the most economical means.  Maximum federal lodging, 
meal, and incidental expense per diem rates will be paid in conformity with the rates 
indentified by the Internal Revenue Service Publication 1542 (City of Dallas, 2004b).  
The city uses the U.S. General Services website to locate the maximum rates allowed for 
the destination of the traveler (City of Dallas, 2004b). See Table 17. 
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2. Hazardous Materials Technician 
In order to figure an accurate estimated cost for training hazardous materials 
technicians a few substantial factors bear consideration, such as locating and selecting an 
accredited Texas Commission on Fire Protection hazardous materials technician class 
with reasonable tuition rates and finding scheduled classes that coincide with a time-
frame that allows for temporary vacancy of staff personnel as well as meeting 
departmental needs.  A hazardous materials technician course is offered locally and is 80 
hours in length for two weeks at eight hours per day; refer to Table 18 for costs (Tarrant 
County College Fire Service Training Center, n.d.b). 
The city of Dallas follows the standard mileage rates established by the Internal 
Revenue Service.  The current IRS standard mileage rate of 51 cents per mile will be 
used for estimating mileage reimbursement cost (IRS, 2010).  Actual mileage for DFR 
members attending training locally will be calculated from each member’s normal work 
assignment to the location of the class.  The mileage estimate used for Table 18 is 
calculated from the Dallas Fire Rescue Training Academy to the location of the 
scheduled hazardous material technician class. 
The Texas Commission on Fire Protection charges a standard fee of $35.00 for 
each application for certification once the Hazardous Materials Technician has 
successfully passed the commission exam (TCFP, n.d.b).  After the $35.00 fee is received 
and processed the TCFP will send the HMTs certificate of certification to Dallas Fire-
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Rescue and update the commission’s database to reflect each individual that possesses a 
Hazardous Materials Technician Certificate (TCFP, n.d.b). 
Another significant cost that must to be figured into the overall cost of training 
personnel is an initial medical physical.  Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1910.120 
(f)(3) Medical Surveillance, directs employers to establish a medical surveillance 
program requiring hazardous materials technicians to undergo a medical physical every 
12 months (United States Department of Labor, 2011). 
At the time of this research, Dallas Fire Rescue does not have a hazardous 
materials technician medical surveillance vendor contract for 2011, but a request proposal 
for medical surveillance has been submitted to the DFR Financial Services Assistant 
Director.  The city purchasing agent has not completed the bid process for the medical 
physicals.  According to past medical surveillance records protected under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security 
Rules and kept by the Hazardous Materials Coordinator, the current proposal for medical 
physicals could be estimated at a cost of approximately $1,900.00 per individual 
physical.  This is the figure that will be used to factor in the total cost of training a DFR 
hazardous materials technician. Refer to Table 18. 
Table 18.   Cost for Training a Hazardous Materials Technician 
  








































3. Fire Investigator 
Dallas Fire-Rescue has the capability to conduct a fire investigator course in-
house.  The course is six weeks in length, which fulfills the Texas Commission on Fire 
Protection minimum recommendation of 150 hours instruction (TCFP, 2007b, p. 1).  
There is a minimal cost per student for books and a fee to the Texas Commission on Fire 
Protection for fire investigator certification once the member has successfully completed 
the course. See Table 19.  
Table 19.   Cost for Training a Fire Investigator 
 Length of Fire 
Investigator Course 
 
Cost of Books per 
Person 
Texas Commission 















4. Police Officer 
Dallas Fire-Rescue enrolls personnel in the Dallas Police Academy for police 
officer training.  The Dallas Police Department (DPD) Web-site lists the Dallas Police 
Academy training as 32 weeks.  However, in a conversation with a DPD Academy 
representative, the training has recently been increased from 32 weeks to 34.5 weeks 
because of new mandated courses by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement 
Officer Standards and Education (TCLEOSE) and new courses DPD added.  There is no 
cost to Dallas Fire-Rescue for tuition, but there is a fee for equipment.  According to the 
Dallas Police Department Quartermaster, the equipment necessary for police training is a 
ballistic vest, duty belt, weapon, holster, handcuffs, handcuff holder and key, and clips 
for ammunition, which amount to $1,487.13.  The Texas Commission on Law 
Enforcement Officer Standards and Education Rules Handbook (2010) states there is no 
fee collected for peace officer certificates (TCLEOSE, 2010, p. 95).  See Table 20. 
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Length of Dallas Police 
Academy 
 












Total Cost per Person 
 
$1,487.13 
The research for the individual cost of each vocation is compiled in Table 21 to 
reflect Dallas Fire-Rescue’s agency requirement for training one bomb technician. 
Table 21.   Total Cost for Training a Bomb Technician in Multiple Vocations 
Dallas Fire-Rescue Vocation 
Requirement 
Total Cost for Training one (1) Person 
per Vocation 
 




















L. EVALUATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TEAM 
HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security 2007 points up the nation’s 
vulnerability to improvised explosive devices (IED) and considers them a high priority 
threat (DHS, 2007b, p. 20).  Improvised explosive devices are homemade explosives 
(HME) assembled with conventional components to create an unconventional weapon 
(Global Security, 2011).  IED can be as simple or sophisticated as the imagination of the  
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designer with the materials available to them (Global Security, 2011).  The range of 
variance in unconventional weapons increases the difficulty in detection and protection 
against them (Global Security, 2011).   
The rationale of countering the threat of explosive attacks against the United 
States prompted the national policy, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19:  
Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States (DHS, 2009).  The directive 
specifically states: 
Terrorists have repeatedly shown their willingness and ability to use 
explosives as weapons worldwide, and there is ample intelligence to 
support the conclusion that they will continue to use such devices to inflict 
harm.  The threat of explosive attacks in the United States is of great 
concern considering terrorists’ ability to make, obtain, and use explosives, 
the ready availability of components used in IED construction, the relative 
technological ease with which an IED can be fashioned, and the nature of 
our free society. (DHS, 2009) 
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are the homeland’s frontline defense 
for countering the threat of explosive attacks against the United States.   
EOD teams have the best training and capabilities to fulfill the aggressive counter 
threat policy laid out in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19:  Combating 
Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States (DHS, 2009).  Civilian bomb technicians 
receive training through the joint efforts of the FBI and U.S. Army at one training 
facility, the Hazardous Device School (Jernigan, 2006).  Training bomb technicians using 
established national standards at one facility ensures a high caliber of professional 
training through the identical consistent delivery of one curriculum. 
National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB), the final 
regulatory authority on EOD teams and bomb technicians, has worked collaboratively 
with other federal agencies that have a strong interest in EOD teams to create and 
authorize (NBSCAB, n.d.a): 
 Standard equipment list and approved equipment list for EOD teams 
 Mandatory requirement of robots to bomb squads 
 Weapons of mass (WMD) equipment 
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 Guidelines for explosive detection canines 
 Critical Incident Response and Technology Seminar (CIRTS) program 
 Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) program 
 Computer-related support to bomb squads (i.e., wireless laptop, software, 
technical database)  
 Development of strategies for Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device 
(VBIED), suicide bomber, and utilizing Radio Controlled Improvised 
Explosive Device (RCIED) technical and operational plans to design a 
corroborative national Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) program 
(NBSCAB, n.d.a) 
The consistency in EOD Teams’ equipment, training, and standards for 
accreditation sets a benchmark for accuracy in successfully completing any mission EOD 
Teams are assigned.  
Bomb technicians and EOD teams can share explosive-related information via a 
national database created by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF) called Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) (Robinson, 2009).  The Bomb 
Arson Tracking System is recognized by NBSCAB as the designated repository for 
explosive-related incident reporting (Robinson, 2009).  
The BATS database allows EOD teams to access, retrieve, and contribute 
information necessary to stay apprised of explosive analysis and intelligence nationwide.  
This collaborative effort among all governmental levels and jurisdictions to share 
information is in-line with the expectations of National Strategy for Homeland Security 
2007 (DHS, 2007b) 
…developing a common baseline for law enforcement activities (e.g., 
standardizing information collection and collation, reporting procedures, 
and data archiving across all jurisdictions in order to improve analysis and 
detection of emerging threats or patterns) so that they may work together 
seamlessly throughout the Nation.  This common approach must be 
capable of tailoring activities at each level to support specific priorities of 
importance to their respective communities and, as necessary, be able to 
fulfill select requests for information as part of the broader national effort 
to the Homeland. (DHS, 2007b, p. 50) 
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Like most special operations teams, EOD teams are made up of volunteers.  
According to the authors of the book Bomb Squad, who were embedded for a year with 
the New York Police Department (NYPD) Bomb Squad, countries outside the United 
States seek to kill bomb technicians because they are a threat to the terrorist bomb 
detonating successfully (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007).  So, why do people volunteer to 
become bomb technicians and members of EOD teams?  The authors of Bomb Squad 
found the answer to this question during one of their interviews: 
Why do bomb technicians stand over these devices so willingly?  Thirty-
three times that question was asked of the NYPD Bomb Squad members 
and thirty-three times the Bomb Squad member’s answer was the same:  
―Somebody has to do it.‖ (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007, p. 95) 
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V. PART I ANALYSIS OF DFR SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS 
A. KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITIES (KSA) JUXTAPOSITION  
The importance of special operations team members mastering the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSA) of numerous tasks during training courses is acquiring 
competency in performing complex job assignments for which standard operating 
procedures (SOP) may not exist because of the rarity and peculiarity of the event.  The 
challenge is maintaining the KSAs once the initial training is completed.  Competencies 
of special operations team members also include possessing attributes in rapid decision 
making during dynamic situations with a high potential for a cascading failure effect.  
The competency of special operations teams points to the adeptness in applying 
knowledge and using resources available to deescalate a catastrophic event rapidly and 
efficiently.  The research shows that numerous hours and abundant money are spent by 
departments to send personnel to specialized training courses for higher level learning 
and competency in various technical subjects.  In analyzing the KSAs of all Dallas Fire-
Rescue special operations teams listed within the tables of this thesis to determine if there 
is a better way to achieve efficiency in special operations missions, two questions are 
relevant: 
1. Is an identifiable paradigm or coequal feature present in the core KSAs 
that suggest some curriculums could be combined for initial training 
purposes? 
2. Does the curriculum KSAs provide the guidance necessary for high-risk 
decision making? 
In response to the first question, training must be defined and understood.  
According to Clark in Instructional System Design Concept Map (as cited in Nadler, 
1984), ―Training is defined as learning that is provided in order to improve performance 
on the present job‖ (Nadler, 1984).  Clark continues to elaborate 
..this differs from a few other definitions in that rather than ―training‖ 
being used as a verb—to train, it defines it from the learners’ action—an 
activity that they perform.  Performance is improved by helping the 
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learners to master a new or established technology.  The technology may 
be a piece of heavy machinery, a computer, a procedure for creating a 
product, or a method of providing a service.  Notice that the last part of the 
definition states that training is provided for the present job.  This includes 
training new personnel to perform their job, introducing a new technology, 
or helping an employee to achieve standards….Note:  We often think of 
technology as computers, electronics, etc., but it is much more.  The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines technology as the practical 
application of knowledge, especially in a particular area.  It includes the 
usage and knowledge of tools, techniques, and crafts, or is systems or 
methods of organization. (Clark, 2004) 
Next, embedded in the training curriculum are the job tasks that require an 
individual have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform.  Clark states, ―A task is a 
well-defined unit of work.  It stands by itself.  It is a logical and necessary action in the 
performance of a job or duty.  It has an identifiable start and end point and results in a 
measurable accomplishment or product‖ (Clark, 2004).  Tasks are the functions necessary 
to perform the job (e.g., technical rescue, render a bomb safe, manage a hazardous 
material incident, or determine the origin of a fire). 
The KSAs are developed from training curriculum based on national standards 
that are accredited by non-profit organizations and recognized as professional 
qualification standards.  In higher standards of training a job hazard analysis has been 
conducted on the job tasks (OSHA, 2002).   
A job hazard analysis is a technique that focuses on job tasks as a way to 
identify hazards before they occur.  It focuses on the relationship between 
the worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment.  Ideally, after 
you identify uncontrolled hazards, you will take steps to eliminate or 
reduce them to an acceptable risk level. (OSHA, 2002, p. 1) 
Comparing all Dallas Fire-Rescue special operations teams core KSAs, an 
identifiable paradigm or coequal feature is not present to suggest the curriculums could 
be combined for initial training purposes.  This is evident because the job hazard analysis 
has a direct relationship with the specific job tasks (which are the known hazards for the 
tasks) embedded in the core KSAs of each training curriculum presented in this research.  
It is important to have the baseline knowledge and understanding of the known hazards in 
order to figure out how to appropriately adjust for the unknown hazards that can be 
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encountered during high-stress, challenging situations. Furthermore, the tasks are specific 
and measurable to the function of each training curriculum.  Combining training 
curriculums for first-time students could result in confusing sequences of a task, missing 
identifiable job hazards, and learners failing to demonstrate proficiency in performing 
tasks effectively to the expected national standards. 
Firefighters attending primary training courses should fundamentally master the 
skills being taught to perform the job effectively.  Skills are another baseline component 
that requires comprehensive understanding.  According to author Neitzel (2006): 
A skill is defined as an action required in order to perform a task that 
involves coordination of body movements.  In a sense, it is nothing more 
than the application of a worker’s knowledge.  Knowledge is defined as an 
understanding of facts, principles, or concepts, including the cognitive 
process necessary to process information. (Neitzel, 2006) 
When firefighters learn the information taught in a formal training course, they 
develop a basic mental script of the experience.  The human memory uses knowledge 
structures to organize the information they have learned (Schank & Lyras, 2008).  As 
stated by Schank and Lyras, a script is sequential set of facts regarding a specific 
situation learned by undergoing the experiences of performing or doing something: 
―Higher level, more abstract notions, enable learning because they allow sharing of 
knowledge across script boundaries‖ (2008).  Firefighters need this baseline script of 
knowledge in order to proceed across script boundaries to higher-level learning and 
expand their knowledge scripts through continued education. 
In response to the second question, even though the tasks and known hazards are 
structured for a specific training curriculum, mixed and unpredictable circumstances can 
arise necessitating the use of one’s judgment.  It would be impossible to codify all tasks 
of special operations into procedures for a comprehensive decision-making tool (Klein, 
2009, p. 19).  According to Klein, the author of Streetlights and Shadows Searching for 
the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making, ―Procedures can lull people into a passive mindset 
of just following the steps and not really thinking about what they are doing.  When we 
become passive, we don’t try to improve our skills‖ (2009, p. 22).  Klein further offers: 
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Research supports this idea of eroding expertise.  A number of studies 
have shown that procedures help people handle typical tasks, but people 
do best in novel situations when they understand the system they need to 
control.  People taught to understand the system develop richer mental 
models than people taught to follow procedures. (2009, p. 23) 
Procedures may have their limitations, but there are certainly benefits to having 
the baseline knowledge and understanding of procedures (Klein, 2009):  
1. Initial training tool for personnel 
2. Memory aid to get personnel started in the direction of solving the 
problem 
3. A starting point or reference of where to begin 
4. Reduce stress and workload for the less complicated part of the problem 
5. Coordinate some consistency within teams when everyone knows the 
procedures. (Klein, 2009, pp. 28–29) 
Special operations teams will need standard operating procedures (SOP) as well 
as the ability and latitude to use one’s judgment when the complex situation escalates 
beyond the SOP.  However, people trained to understand the system, the limitations of 
their equipment, and known hazards are more flexible and will recognize complex 
situations whereas people trained to follow procedures will not (Klein, 2009). 
The national standard that training curriculums are based on is not intended to be 
all inclusive of the knowledge essential to eradicate risks.  The National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) states its code and standards are ―intended to minimize the 
possibility and effects of fire and other risks‖ (NFPA, 2011).  The NFPA standards are 
used as minimal or basic accepted measures to guide the nation’s fire service personnel in 
performing overall job tasks.  As a result the KSAs developed from the national standards 
are utilized as methods when training people to understand the system as well as the 
tasks.  Mastering the KSAs of the curriculum will arm the individual with explicit 
knowledge (facts and guidelines) and encourage tacit knowledge (a repertoire for skills 
and experience) in making high-risk decisions (Klein, 2009). 
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B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS AND CONTINUING EDUCATION 
HOURS 
Budget and cost will be a factor when considering training personnel for a special 
operations team assignment.  A detail to take into account is how to keep the personnel 
adequately trained in a job assignment that is labeled as low-frequency/high-risk once the 
initial training is completed.  Minimum continuing education (CE) hours are required so 
as to remain in accordance with the rules and regulations set forth by the governing 
agency issuing the special certification.  Dallas Fire-Rescue has the option of increasing 
the minimum CE hours for adeptness and competency.  The CE hours for Dallas Fire-
Rescue special operations teams are listed in Tables 22–24 for comparison. 
Table 22.   DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team Annual Continuing Education 
Hours 





Hazardous Materials Technician 




DFR Hazardous Materials Response Team Continuing Education 




Table 23.   DFR Urban Search & Rescue Annual Continuing Education Hours 





Urban Search & Rescue 
 
40 hours 
DFR Urban Search & Rescue Continuing Education 
Total Annual Training Hours 60 
 
Table 24.   DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team Annual Continuing Education 
Hours 
DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team Continuing Education Hours 
 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Practical 
Exercise/Training 16 hours Monthly 
 
192 hours 












DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team Continuing Education 
Total Annual Training Hours 282 
 
Another consideration with regard to training is mandatory departmental-wide 
training, including: emergency medical services (EMS), leadership seminars, new 
technology updates (e.g., computer-aided dispatch system, National Fire Incident 
Reporting System (NFIRS) new equipment, and new or updated procedures.  
Departmental-wide training will decrease the number of on-duty training hours available 
for mandatory continuing education making it necessary to reschedule the missed CE 
training day. One other mandatory training aspect that impacts Emergency Operations 
Division personnel assigned to special operations teams (hazardous materials technicians 
 93 
and urban search & rescue) is two training and evaluation phases for four hours per 
session a calendar year (DFR, 2008, p. 302).  The training and evaluation phase will not 
have a bearing on the training hours for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team because 
they are not firefighters or assigned to the Emergency Operations Division. 
In comparing the total amount of continuing education hours for special 
operations teams, the overarching question is: Can special operations teams realistically 
complete the required number of continuing education hours while on-duty?  The 
Hazardous Material Response Team (HMRT) and Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) 
Team perform dual roles for Dallas Fire-Rescue.  As firefighters they work 24 hour shifts 
and respond to fires, emergency medical services (EMS), hazardous materials, and urban 
search & rescue incidents.  The priority next to emergency response is completing all 
training. 
The shift schedule 24/48, which is 24 hours on and 48 hours off, allows 
approximately 121–122 shifts in a calendar year for a firefighter to work; however, due to 
scheduled leave (vacation, holidays, Kelly days) firefighters are available for duty 
approximately 103 shifts a year.  Most training is conducted within an eight-hour window 
during weekdays and there is no minimum training requirement on weekends or holidays.  
Weekends can be used for make-up mandatory continuing education, if deemed 
necessary by the station officer.  Other mandatory departmental-wide training is 
conducted during weekdays only because of instructor availability (DFR, 2008, pp. 293–
310).  Taking this into account, there are aves approximately 87 shifts available for 
completing all mandatory training. 
The hazardous material technician (HMT) assigned to the Hazardous Materials 
Response Team is required to complete 40 hours of continuing education a year.  If the 
HMT actually worked 103 shifts a year, he/she would have to study 23 minutes a shift to 
meet the 40-hour CE requirement.  If the HMT working 103 shifts were to study on 
weekdays only, reducing the number of shifts to 87 weekday shifts, he/she would have to 
study 28 minutes each shift to satisfy the 40-hour requirement. See Table 25. 
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The Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Team member is required to complete 60 
hours of continuing education a year.  If the US&R member actually worked 103 shifts a 
year, he/she would have to study 35 minutes a shift to meet the 60-hour CE requirement.  
If the US&R member working 103 shifts were to study on weekdays only, reducing the 
number of shifts to 87 weekday shifts, he/she would have to study 41 minutes each shift 
to satisfy the 60-hour requirement. See Table 26. 
Bomb technicians/arson investigators (as proposed in the Bomb Squad Transition 
Plan explained in Chapter IV) will perform dual roles and respond to all threats, potential 
or actual incidents regarding all types of incendiary devices, explosives, or bombings, 
render devices safe and/or dispose of them, collect evidence, submit prosecution reports 
to the proper authority, conduct investigations, provide dignitary protection, and respond 
in the 16-county region when called (Homeland Security and Operations Division, 2009).  
In the arson investigator role he/she will investigate and determine all fire causes in the 
city of Dallas, make emergency responses to multiple alarm fires, when special called by 
incident commanders, fire fatalities, serious burn victims, and when requested by the 
Dallas Police Department for criminal activity involving fire (DFR, 2003). Other non-
emergency activities include the authority to investigate, question witnesses, arrest 
suspects, and testify in court concerning incidents they have participated in (DFR, 2003). 
Training is a priority next to all daily duties. 
As bomb technicians/arson investigators the shift schedule is 24/72, that is 24 
hours on and 72 hours off, allowing approximately 91–92 shifts in a calendar year for 
them to work; however, due to scheduled leave (vacation, holidays, Kelly days) they are 
available for duty approximately 76 shifts a year. 
Bomb technicians/arson investigators are required to complete 282 hours of 
continuing education a year.  If the bomb technician/arson investigator actually worked 
76 shifts a year, he/she would have to study 3.7 hours a shift to meet the 282-hour CE 
requirement.  If the bomb technician/arson investigator working 76 shifts were to study 
on weekdays only, reducing the number of shifts to 65 weekday shifts, he/she would have 
to study 4.3 hours each shift to satisfy the 282-hour requirement. See Table 27. 
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Table 25.   Continuing Education Study Time Necessary for DFR Hazardous 
Materials Technician 
Hazardous Materials Technician 
Shift Schedule 24/48 
40 Continuing Education Hours Annually  
 
Available annually for 103 Shifts 
 
Must study 23 minutes per shift to 
complete 40 hours 
 
Studying weekdays only decreases to 87 
Shifts 
 
Must study 28 minutes per shift to 
complete 40 hours 
Table 26.   Continuing Education Study Time Necessary for DFR Urban Search & 
Rescue Members 
Urban Search & Rescue 
Shift Schedule 24/48 
60 Continuing Education Hours Annually 
 
Available annually for 103 Shifts 
 
Must study 35 minutes per shift to 
complete 60 hours 
 
Studying weekdays only decreases to 87 
Shifts 
  
Must study 41 minutes per shift to 
complete 60 hours 
Table 27.   Continuing Education Study Time Necessary for DFR Bomb 
Technician/Arson Investigator 
Bomb Technician/Arson Investigator 
Shift Schedule 24/72 
282 Continuing Education Hours Annually 
 
Available annually for 76 Shifts 
 
Must study 3.7 hours per shift to complete 
282 hours 
 
Studying weekdays only decreases to 65 
Shifts 
 
Must study 4.3 hours per shift to complete 
282 hours 
 96 
The study time per shift in Tables 25–27 offers the best case scenario in 
expressing how much time is necessary per shift to satisfy the required CE hours 
annually.  No consideration was given to sick time, injured time, attendance incentive 
leave day, emergency incident that lasts through several operational periods, a day spent 
in court testifying, or other fire department business that may take priority and cause 
continuing education training to be rescheduled. 
Of the three special operations teams listed in Tables 25–27, two of the teams 
prove to have adequate available on-duty time to realistically complete the required 
continuing education hours, hence developing subject matter experts (SME) in those 
fields.  The bomb technician/arson investigator will present a challenge for the 
department in developing SMEs.   
Even though special operations teams’ missions are high risk, the significance of 
the mission being conducted by subject matter experts rather than exemplary performers 
will lower the risk of the mission (Tucker & Lamb, 2007, p. 151).  In accordance with 
Clark’s work, subject matter experts are the masters of their craft (2004).  They know and 
understand the order of steps to perform tasks, speak technical-jargon, comprehend 
acceptable performance objectives, and perform all tasks to an expected higher level of 
standards (Clark, 2004).  SMEs become proficient through numerous hours of training, 
studying, scenario-based training, and on-the-job experience.  On the contrary, 
―exemplary performers are able to perform the tasks and are worthy of imitation, but do 
not have a great deal of knowledge about the peripherals surrounding the subject or task‖ 
(Clark, 2004). 
The excerpt below from Bomb Squad: A Year Inside the Nation’s Most Exclusive 
Police Unit, portrays the importance of having, developing, and keeping the right amount 
of subject matter experts on an explosive ordnance disposal team (Esposito & Gerstein, 
2007).  Author’s note:  Esposito and Gerstein published Bomb Squad A Year Inside the 
Nation’s Most Exclusive Police Unit in 2007; however, the Hazardous Device School 
Basic Course was expanded to six weeks in 2005 to include robotics training (Jernigan, 
2006). 
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As the year went on and more bombs exploded and a Republican 
convention in New York loomed, a series of police executives offered 
Lieutenant Torre proposals to increase the NYPD Bomb Squad size.  
Several of these were based on ideas about what a Bomb Squad does, 
which included deterrence, boosting public confidence, teaching bomb 
awareness courses, and creating an omnipresence.  Within two weeks after 
joining the squad, we understood the explanations of why not only were 
more officers unnecessary, but having too many reduced the chance that 
each officer would get enough time in the field—time on packages, to stay 
sharp.  Meetings were scheduled to consider whether the squad ought to at 
least have another dozen dogs—at these meetings the costs of training, 
feeding, and housing the dogs were discussed.  Lieutenant Torre explained 
that the number of dogs in the squad was designed to complement the 
number of teams in the field.  More dogs were not needed to detect bombs. 
A Bomb Squad’s job, its only job, was detecting bombs and rendering 
them safe.  For this, a few dozen men and a dozen or so dogs were a far 
more efficient unit than one that had increased its size to encompass 
secondary roles.  The lieutenant did not want anyone in the squad to take 
his eye off the job of defusing bombs or the requirement to maintain his 
own skills through rigorous training.  For the younger bomb technicians, 
the training process takes two years.  It began months before any NYPD 
apprentice bomb tech was even sent to the U.S. Army—FBI Hazardous 
Devices School in Huntsville, Alabama, where he would earn his ―license 
to die‖ in a five week basic course.  It continued for months afterward to 
ensure that the techs knew more than just enough to get blown up.  Post-
HDS, training was relentless, even though many of the NYPD bomb techs 
had already been hardened as Marines with tours in Afghanistan and the 
Gulf, or as Air Force EOD men, Army Rangers, and Navy SEALS, 
specialties where explosives detection and defusing often were at the 
center of the job. (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007, pp. 60–61) 
One could argue that continuing education can be applied to multiple training 
categories.  For instance, during continuing education classes when hazardous chemicals 
and explosives are being discussed and reviewed, or studying the value of proper 
investigative techniques, there is probably little doubt that one could take continuing 
education credit in each category (e.g., hazardous materials and explosive ordnance 
disposal, or fire investigator and police officer).  However, in striving for optimal 
education and training to develop subject matter experts rather than exemplary 
performers, the instructor will have to assess and determine: the student’s degree of 
knowledge, ability to perform to the national standards, and the student’s skill level when 
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performing tasks.  Next, it will be necessary for the instructor to adjust his/her didactics 
to meet the optimum educational needs of the students.  As stated in the Systems 
Approach to Training (SAT) Manual, the goal of instruction is, ―For a learning outcome 
to be achieved, instruction must be effective and efficient.  Instruction is effective when it 
teaches learning objectives based on job performance requirements and efficient when it 
makes the best use of resources‖ (United States Marine Corps, 2004, p. ii).  There are 
many variables to consider before checking the box showing credit in multiple training 
categories.  Finally, training and education will only be as good as the instructor 
delivering the content of the material. 
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VI. PART II ANALYSIS OF DFR SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS 
STATUS QUO/SEPARATE TEAMS 
A. FEASIBILITY FROM THE FIRE SERVICE STANDPOINT AND THE 
PRACTICALITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS IN THE FIRE 
SERVICE 
If special operations teams were not in the fire service, where would they reside?  
Common sense and logic place special operations teams as a resource within the fire 
service. Emergency response is an involuntary reflex in the fire service culture, similar to 
the learned behavior of Pavlov’s dogs reacting by salivating to the ringing of a bell in 
anticipation of food being delivered.  When an emergency run is dispatched over station 
speakers, house bells are sounded to alert firefighters to take their assigned positions on 
emergency apparatus and respond with flashing lights and sirens blaring.  Their reflexes 
have been trained to automatically react to the sound of bells ringing and anticipate 
preparing to engage for mitigating some type of threat deemed immediately dangerous to 
life and health (IDLH) event.  This human behavior is learned over time and firefighters 
become conditioned (by remaining calm and restrained) while anticipating and preparing 
to intervene in crisis situations. 
Firefighters pride themselves on swift response times.  They arrive without delay 
to the emergency incident and dismount their apparatus in protective gear, with tools and 
equipment ready to perform any action necessary to bring relief to the situation.  
Firefighters are a tightly knit group of individuals with various talents that are trained in 
basic rescue techniques.  Firefighters continuously refresh and enhance their basic 
training skills through continual study of building construction, elevators in high-rise 
buildings, hazardous materials, rope skills, and survival techniques in saving our own 
(Norman, 2004).  Firefighters have the perfect foundation for supplemental training in 
highly specialized topics (Norman, 2009, p. 4).   
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As stated in Fire Department Special Operations, the leading reason that special 
operations teams are feasible and practical in the fire service is their capability to respond 
to incidents that are not on fire, have a potential to catch on fire, or actually on fire 
(Norman, 2004, p.4).  Firefighters can mitigate any/all of these incidents because of their 
equipment, tools, and capabilities.  As reported by Norman, fire is the main cause of 
structure collapse, sometimes trapping firefighters and/or civilians (2004, p. 4). He 
further asserts that confined space rescues may or may not involve working in toxic 
atmospheres (Norman, 2004).  The only trained personnel capable of dealing with a 
rescue situation this critical are firefighters (2004).  Firefighters are not held back by 
toxic atmospheres (fire or no fire) because their protective gear includes a self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA) (Norman, 2009, pp. 4–5).  The fire service remains 
unrelenting in its efforts to continue preparedness, interdiction, response, and recovery 
efforts for all potential critical incidents through daily training requirements.  
It is impractical to reason that special operations teams such as urban search & 
rescue, explosive ordnance disposal, and hazardous materials response teams can be 
accurately assessed based on response numbers.  Quantitative renderings of a utility 
based solely on the number of operational runs these specialized teams make are 
inaccurate and shortsighted. Special operations teams respond to what is known in the 
business as high-risk/low-frequency events and most decision-makers in the fire service 
base the need for a station location or apparatus placement/relocation generally on the 
number of runs dispatched to the area.  Another fallacy is using fire and/or emergency 
medical services (EMS) incidents by which to measure special operations teams’ 
response.  There is no correlation in analyzing high run volumes (fire and EMS run 
statistics) to what is already known as low-frequency events. 
The evaluation of special operations teams incidents should be examined by 
disclosing the actual run data.  The interpretation of the incident data should include:  
 The nature of the incident and why it happened 
 True on-scene time 
 What actually transpired during the incident 
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 Tools and equipment used including other special call resources 
summoned to the incident 
 Number of lives saved 
 Other disciplines involved in the incident 
 Stakeholders involved 
 Other city departments involved 
 Other jurisdictions involved 
 Conclusion of the incident 
 Ramifications of the incident 
Using the parameters above will supply what is needed for an accurate evaluation 
and study of special operations incidents.  Subsequently, the information can define areas 
of justification and support for special operations teams because basic firefighting 
companies do not possess advanced technical rescue skills or capabilities. 
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS CAN COMPLEMENT OR SUPPORT 
OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS 
Military Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has a dogma ―equip the 
warrior, not man the equipment‖ that places the human element of Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) as the top priority rather than technology (Tucker & Lamb, 2007, p. 149).  
Fire service special operations teams abide by this same dogma through the rigorous 
training regimen they follow in checking, maintaining, calibrating, and learning the high-
tech equipment they carry because they have to be able to improvise if the technology 
fails.  Hence the human element must take over and transcend beyond the limitations of 
just relying on technology.  Facing these challenges pushes special operations members 
to become subject matter experts and develop distinguishing characteristics of endurance. 
Special operations teams complementing or supporting other special operations 
teams can be the best option for the worst case scenario.  This is made apparent during 
incidents when the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) lends their proficient 
knowledge of hazardous substances to support the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
Team.  In addition, HMRTs can offer equipment that is unavailable to EOD teams that 
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can be an invaluable asset to bomb technicians in mitigating the response scene.  When 
HMRTs supply equipment (e.g., monitors, instrumentation, and detectors) for EOD 
teams, the hazardous materials technician (HMT) will have to decipher the readings.  
Deciphering the readings will not solidify an irrevocable determination of a hazardous 
substance.  
It is a misconception to believe that handheld hazardous materials 
instrumentation/detection units will provide a clear reading of identifiable hazardous 
substances (Noll, Hildebrand, & Yvorra, 2005).  Sophisticated technological devices have 
limitations.  For example, handheld devices may show a positive ―hit‖ on any element in 
the chemical chain of a substance without identifying the particular substance (Noll, 
Hildebrand, & Yvorra, 2005, pp. 292–297).  Now it is up to the hazardous materials 
technician through additional diagnostics to further dissect the possibilities of the 
hazardous substance.  Basically, the HMT will have to examine the possibilities in 
reverse order, meaning ruling out what the hazardous substance is not.  A HMT that 
incorrectly interprets a reading from any instrumentation could be exposing all personnel 
to an environment that is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). 
The veracity is that bomb technicians are not hazardous materials technicians but 
do have an understanding of hazardous substances and explosive materials.  A bomb 
technician’s job is to determine the consequence of a device by choosing the best method 
to ultimately render the device safe and neutralize the incident.  Conversely, hazardous 
materials technicians do not go down range, or in other words handle bombs/explosives 
in any way at all to attempt rendering a device safe. 
Consider Dallas Fire-Rescue (DFR) EOD and HMRT as a case in point of how 
these teams can collaborate during an EOD suspicious package type response.  Currently, 
the EOD Team does not have any radiation detection equipment.  The HMRT can 
provide this equipment to the EOD Team.  The radiation detection device can be attached 
to the robot but operated by the bomb technician.  Once the robot returns with the device 
a hazardous materials technician can interpret the reading and advise the EOD Team of 
the known hazardous risks of the situation.  Considering this information collectively, the 
teams can discuss the possible options and incident action plan (IAP).  The HMRT can 
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provide support by estimating and preparing hot to cold zone perimeters for responders 
and civilian safety.  A decontamination plan for responders and/or mass decontamination 
can be configured and ready to employ if necessary.  As a final point, the HMRT should 
remain in a stand-by mode until the bomb technician has rendered the device safe. 
Furthermore, a bomb technician’s protective bomb suit will not protect him/her 
from inhalation or skin absorption exposures (Verrico, 2010).  If a bomb technician were 
to disrupt a package that presents an inhalation or skin absorption hazard, the HMRT can 
immediately decontaminate the bomb technician, another rationale for the HMRT to 
complement the EOD Team. 
HMRTs and EOD Teams have similar strategies but different operational tactics 
for returning the scene to a pre-emergency status.  Both usually respond to incidents 
where very little credible information is available or even offered.  Often they go into a 
situation blind (unknown origin of the hazard and no available information) and apply 
diagnostics to make a hazard assessment and risk evaluation.  They formulate incident 
action plans, but each team employs the distinct operational tactics necessary for 
completing its mission.  It is vital that subject matter experts from each respective team 
work together in complementary or supportive roles to create the best possibility for a 
successful resolution.  
It is unrealistic to believe that special operations teams can be integrated 
department-wide and be efficient in administering unconventional response techniques.  
The NYPD Bomb Squad has suffered from this demise in the account taken below from 
Bomb Squad A Year Inside the Nation’s Most Exclusive Police Unit (Esposito & 
Gerstein, 2007): 
Even inside the New York City Police Department—arguably the most 
sophisticated in the world—by early 2004 the commander of various 
special units had begun to want to incorporate a portion of the Bomb 
Squad’s mission into their units.  They did not understand that defusing 
bombs was not a part-time job.  It required an ethos of doing one thing, 
constantly and quietly and well.  One commander wanted to consider 
using plastic explosives to blow doors off of hinges, without necessarily 
being aware of the refinements of shaping charges, the storage of 
explosives, or the need to maintain skills; not to mention what would 
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happen when it turned out to be wrong door, which past experience 
dictated would happen during a raid sooner or later.  Another police boss 
wanted to build a unit of ―explosives mitigation experts.‖  This unit would 
take untried and uneducated detectives and supervisors and plunge them 
into the arcane world of tracking the transfer of bomb-making skills, the 
building of bombs, the ease with which terrorists could acquire the needed 
materials in hardware stores, and what equipment a Bomb Squad ought to 
consider using.  This quixotic unit would a year later so embarrass the 
Police Department by its inept interaction with British bomb technicians 
that in 2006 the damage had still not been undone.  In observing bomb 
technicians at work, well-meaning officials became confused about the 
skills behind what appeared to be done with such ease. (Esposito & 
Gerstein, 2007, pp. 59–60) 
Any special operations team can be substituted for the NYPD Bomb Squad in the 
situation above and yield duplicate results.  When technical equipment and complex 
resources are exploited, their capacity for effectiveness will be greatly diminished and 
might conceivably be detrimental. 
Concepts that are developed or technology that is used in Special Operations 
Forces can be perfected and transferred to conventional forces.  When this transpires, 
opportunities are presented for Special Operations Forces to acquisition improved 
equipment and resume surpassing the limitations of conventional forces (Tucker & Lamb, 
2007, p. 149).  Basic firefighting crews have benefited from fire service special 
operations teams through contributions to their arsenal.  In particular, Dallas Fire-Rescue 
Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) is no longer the initial response unit for 
carbon monoxide (CO) incidents.  Single (CO) gas detectors are carried on all DFR fire 
apparatus for determining carbon monoxide levels and the HMRT is special called if 
needed.  Additionally, low-and high-pressure air bags used for lifting heavy objects in 
technical rescue situations are carried on DFR Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Team.  
Low-pressure air bags have been deemed appropriate for conventional use and all DFR 
truck companies carry them as part of their equipment inventory. 
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C. IS THE FRAMEWORK FOR DALLAS FIRE-RESCUE TEAMS 
FLEXIBLE ENOUGH FOR MANY FIRE DEPARTMENTS TO UTILIZE 
WHEN ESTABLISHING OR MAINTAINING SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
TEAMS? 
The importance of developing special operations teams’ subject matter experts 
(SME) has been critically examined and analyzed in this research.  A principal finding is 
that no single person can be an SME in multiple disciplines, nor can one special 
operations team carry the amount and variety of required equipment caches.  The cost of 
special operations teams will be crucial to decision makers and the epitome of the lessons 
learned from the NYPD in integrating bomb technicians department-wide proved to be 
less than mediocre and completely unacceptable. 
During difficult economic times when fire service budgets are laboriously 
scrutinized, fire service special operations teams become a ―precarious value.‖  
Consistent with precarious values as defined in Unconventional Warfare:  Rebuilding 
U.S. Special Operations Forces (Marquis, 1997): 
As described by Philip Selznick in Leadership in Administration, 
precarious values are those goals or missions within an organization that 
are in conflict with, or in danger of being overwhelmed by, the primary 
goals or missions of the organization.  Precarious values may be at risk 
because they are in conflict with the primary organizational culture, or 
sense of mission, of the institution. (Marquis, 1997) 
In the case of Dallas Fire-Rescue, there is no doubt that the sense of the mission 
has changed and the abounding need for cultural reform is evident.  In December 2009, 
The Dallas Morning News reported the city of Dallas, Texas, was officially declared as 
one of the nation’s top 10 targets for terrorism by the Department of Homeland Security 
(Gillman, 2009).  This designation was approved at the urging of formal pleas by city 
government officials to the DHS Secretary (Gillman, 2009).  Compensation to the Dallas 
area for a top 10 moniker was approximately $25 million dollars under the 2010 Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) for strengthening homeland security (Gillman, 2009). 
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The framework of Dallas Fire-Rescue Special Operations Teams that has been 
laid out in each chapter has positive aspects as well as inadequacies.  The inadequacies of 
all DFR special operations teams revolve around staffing each team appropriately with 
subject matter experts to maintain optimum operational performance and efficiency.  The 
recommendations for these inadequacies will be presented in Chapter VII.  The positive 
aspects for establishing and maintaining special operations teams are charted in Table 28: 
Table 28.   Positive Aspects of Dallas Fire-Rescue Operations Teams 




Selection for Special Operations Teams are made from volunteers only 
 
Adhering to national recognized standards when training personnel 
 
All Special Operations Teams are capable of fulfilling city and regional responses 
 
Vigilance of Special Operations Teams to mitigate complex technical events that exceed 
the guidelines of standard operating procedures 
 
Dual roles (firefighting and search & rescue) can be considerably cost effective as seen in 
the Urban Search & Rescue Team 
 
Requiring on-duty continuing education (C.E.) decreases overtime pay and affirms all 
members are getting the same information 
 
Staff Special Operations Teams appropriately following national standards or the best 
policy is to mirror the national standards when no specific directive has been set 
 
Special Operations Teams complementing and/or supporting other Special Operations 
Teams 
 
Special Operations Teams advancing conventional firefighting forces by transferring 
concepts and technology they have perfected and no longer need for unconventional use 
 
The value each Special Operations Team offers in minimizing complex challenges of 
homeland security and defense 
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As described in the municipal management series Managing Fire and Rescue 
Services (Compton, 2002): 
When local government funds the fire department and its career fire 
protection personnel, one can expect the range of departmental services to 
blend the reactive with the more proactive.  Proactive fire department 
services, besides increasing the value of budgetary expenditures for the 
department, benefit the community by improving public safety.  And as 
the fire department assumes a role in improving the quality of life in the 
community, the department gains public support. (Compton, 2002, p. 128) 
It is incumbent on fire service executive administrations to carefully consider 
special operations teams as a proactive stance in moving the fire service away from the 
status quo of basic fire protection and commit to establishing homeland security 
preparedness and response capabilities to local communities. 
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VII. CHALLENGING TRADITION—THE VALUE INNOVATION 
OF RANK-SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM  
Previous chapters of this thesis demonstrate that the requirements and 
expectations for special operations teams are set at a higher level than for conventional 
firefighters.  Special operations teams are special and comprised of an elite group of 
firefighters.  As described by the author Norman, some firefighters entertain the idea of 
becoming a special operations team member through misplaced perceptions of glamour 
and increased monetary benefits (2009).  All firefighters are not qualified for enlistment 
into special operations teams, and some are unaware of the required personal 
commitment—which is unyielding and unforgiving.  Deputy Chief Ray Downey of the 
New York City Fire Department (FDNY) used to call this type of person a ―front-piece 
collector‖ because they ―are only interested in the perceived benefits of working in the 
special unit; going to a lot of fires and interesting assignments, perhaps specialization 
pay, and reduced administrative duties‖ (Norman, 2009, p. 24). 
Chief Downey knew best what kind of person that it took to be a special 
operations team member because he was a pioneer in the technical rescue field during his 
forty-year career with FDNY (Norman, 2009).  He was a major force in creating Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) urban search & rescue (US&R) teams, and 
was a FEMA Response Operations Chief, deploying to all types of disasters when called 
(Norman, 2009).  On the fateful day of September 11, 2001, Chief Downey was the chief 
in charge of Special Operations Command (SOC) commanding special operations units 
and assisting in the rescue of victims in the North Tower when it collapsed (Norman, 
2009, p. ix), ending the life but not the legacy of a force multiplier for unconventional 
change in the fire service. 
It is the goal of this research to thoroughly identify and analyze the factors that 
will contribute to the continued and sustained professional development of the fire 
service in an era of dynamic threats.  This document is an instrument that can be utilized 
as a force multiplier, driving forward with innovative changes, guiding the fire service,  
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and acclimatizing the culture to the challenging times in which we live.  I concur with 
Luntz’ statement, ―terrorism has no boundaries, and neither should efforts to prevent it‖ 
(Luntz, 2004, p. 1). 
A. VALUE INNOVATION FOR DFR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
RESPONSE TEAM (HMRT) 
The vision for the HMRT is creating a dedicated full-time hazardous materials 
response team staffed with subject matter experts (SME) through rank-specific 
organizational reform.  The value innovation of this reorganization will save lives and 
property while reducing recovery costs. 
Why is creating a dedicated full-time HMRT important to the city of Dallas?  The 
criticality of a dedicated team lies in the city of Dallas’ ability to remain a Municipal 
Separate Storm Sewer System (MS4) permit holder.  Storm Water Management is the 
department responsible for enforcing and adhering to the requirements for the Texas 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (TPDES) Municipal Separate Storm Sewer 
System (MS4) Permit Number WQ0004396000, issued to the city of Dallas by the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) (City of Dallas, 2007–2008).  DFR 
Hazardous Materials Response Team is the special operations team that provides the spill 
response program, required by the state for the city of Dallas to hold a MS4 permit (City 
of Dallas, 2007–2008).  Basically, the HMRT keeps Storm Water Management and the 
city of Dallas in compliance with the MS4 permit requirements as stated in The City of 
Dallas Annual Report Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (TPDES) (City of 
Dallas, 2007–2008): 
Continue and improve as necessary existing programs which prevent, 
contain, and respond to spills that may discharge into the MS4.  The spill 
response programs may include a combination of spill response actions by 
the permittee (and/or another public or private entity), and legal 
requirements for private entities within the jurisdiction of the permittee 
[Part III.B.7 of TPDES Permit No. WQ0004396000]. (City of Dallas, 
2007–2008, p. 48) 
City of Dallas Storm Water Management is a vital stakeholder in the mission of 
the HMRT because of the reimbursement funding it provides Dallas Fire-Rescue for the 
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HMRT services.  Storm Water Management reimburses DFR for the HMRTs Medical 
Surveillance Program, a hazmat coordinator, advanced training, equipment, tools, and for 
the incidents abated by the HMRT. 
When the HMRT responds to an incident, they not only mitigate the incident but 
are instrumental in gathering the information necessary to bill the responsible party for 
the environmental remediation or hazardous spill clean-up.  According to DFR Financial 
Services data explained in an e-mail, for fiscal year 09–10, $300,942.00 was billed-out 
for reimbursement with $252,389.00 actually being collected; an 84 percent successful 
remediation reimbursement rate that the HMRT was responsible in recovering for the city 
of Dallas. 
Collecting 84 percent of remediation is a remarkable return for the invoices that 
were billed out to the party responsible for the hazardous spill.  In essence, the HMRT is 
generating revenue that could be returned to supplement the funding for the HMRT rather 
than being deposited into the city’s general fund.  With an experienced, dedicated full-
time HMRT the possibility exists to increase the 84 percent collection rate closer to a 100 
percent.  Why? Dedicated full-time subject matter experts will spawn the common core 
elements of capabilities and results (Covey & Merrill, 2006) by inspiring creative 
thinking and innovation within the HMRT.  The hazardous materials technicians (HMT) 
will become more engaged in cross-functional relationships while feeling an individual 
(self-imposed) responsibility to the other members of the team as well as the organization 
(Covey & Merrill, 2006).  In addition, the morale of the HMRT will be boosted. 
Rank-specific organizational reform is the key to developing subject matter 
experts coupled with the department recovering the total value of the training cost for a 
special operations team member.  For example, using Table 2 located in Chapter II, the 
cost for DFR to train one hazardous materials technician is $8,590.50, which will be 
rounded to $8,600.00 for this demonstration.  The cost value for the department can be 
satisfied by retaining a HMT within the Hazardous Materials Response Team for eight 
years. See Table 29.  Experiences and advanced training during the eight-year time-frame 
will develop subject matter experts necessary for staffing a hazardous materials response 
team. 
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Table 29.   Cost Value to DFR for Retaining Hazardous Materials Technicians on the 
Hazardous Materials Response Team 






































The general problem with maintaining a hazardous materials technician in the 
Hazardous Materials Response Team is rank-specific staffing structure due to 
promotions.  A hazardous materials technician should not be penalized for career 
progression.  This problem can be alleviated by allowing a hazardous materials 
technician to stay on the team when he/she promotes.  The goal is to develop subject 
matter experts while the department recovers an educational cost value by keeping 
experts in place.  The return on investment is considerable in terms of maintaining 
expertise; developing senior level experience; and the collateral benefits of continual 
mentoring within the team.  In a sense, the value of retaining subject matter experts on 
special operations teams can be considered priceless to the department and community 
during complex, chaotic events that no one else can handle. 
For this example, assume four hazardous materials technicians promote out of the 
HMRT.  The cost to replace four hazardous materials technicians is $34,400.00 
($8,600.00 x 4).  However, if these four hazardous materials technicians only served four 
years on the HMRT, the department’s loss is $17,200.00 for removing all four HMTs 
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prior to serving eight years, plus the cost to train four more HMTs.  The cost to keep the 
HMT within the team after promoting can be figured by using the current pay schedule, 
City of Dallas Uniform Fire Salary Schedule effective October 1, 2010.  In conforming to 
the pay schedules the high estimated average for a promotion is approximately $250.00 
monthly or $3,000.00 annually (City of Dallas, 2010).  
Next, to keep a hazardous materials technician in the HMRT one must understand 
borrowed positions.  This is simple because each fire apparatus is assigned one officer, 
one driver engineer, and three firefighters.  Borrow the promoted position, in this case 
using a driver engineer position, for the HMRT and pay temporary assignment pay (TAP) 
for the vacated driver position on the fire apparatus.  Temporary assignment pay is the 
pay differential for a lower ranking member to staff a higher ranking position.  The 
average cost for temporary assignment pay can be estimated at $10.00 per shift for 
approximately 100 shifts.  The logic for using 100 shifts is that there are approximately 
121–122 shifts in a calendar year and due to a member’s accrued scheduled leave days 
(vacation, holidays, Kelly, attendance incentive), they will receive an estimated 20–22 
shifts a year off.  Temporary assignment pay would have been paid during the 20–22 
shifts anyway, but not the 100 shifts that is reasonable to use for this illustration.  
Temporary assignment pay for 100 shifts is $1,000.00 ($10.00 x 100). See Tables 30 and 
31 for comparison. 
Table 30.   Annual cost to DFR (Promotion Pay and TAP) to Retain One Promoted 
Hazardous Materials Technician within the Hazardous Materials Response 
Team  
Annual cost to DFR (Promotion Pay and TAP) to Retain One Promoted 
Hazardous Materials Technician within the HMRT 
 
Annual cost of promotion pay for one 
Hazardous Materials Technician to remain 




Annual cost of Temporary Assignment Pay 
(TAP) for borrowed position 
 
$1,000.00 
Total Annual Cost (Promotion Pay and 
TAP) to retain one Hazardous Materials 





Annual cost to DFR (Promotion Pay and TAP) to Retain One Promoted 
Hazardous Materials Technician within the HMRT 
 
 
Total annual cost to retain one Hazardous Materials Response Technician on the HMRT 
to satisfy the remaining four years of the eight-year commitment is $16,000.00  
($4,000.00 x 4).  
 
Table 31.   Cost to Retain Four Promoted Hazardous Materials Technicians vs. Cost 
to Train Four New Hazardous Materials Technicians 
Cost to Retain Four Promoted HMTs vs. Cost to Train Four New 
HMTs 
(Based on a HMTs  initial eight-year commitment to the HMRT once they are assigned) 
 
Cost to retain four promoted HMTs for the 
remaining four years of their eight-year 
commitment [from table 29 ($16,000 x 4)]  
 
$64,000.00 
Cost to train four new HMTs to replace the 
four that promoted out of the team 
($8,600.00 x 4)  
 
$34,400.00 
 Cost value of four HMTs lost due to 
promotion and removal from the HMRT 
serving only four years of an eight-year 
commitment 
[cost of years 5–8 from table 28] 
$17,200.00 
 Total cost to DFR for removing four HMTs 
and training four new HMTs 
($34,400.00 + $21,828.00) 
$51,600.00 
 
$12,400.00 is the cost to DFR for retaining four HMTs and developing Subject Matter 
Experts (SME) for the remaining four years of the eight-year commitment ($64,000.00–
$51,600.00). 
 
The cost to DFR per subject matter expert (SME) is only $3,100.00 per Hazardous 
Materials Response Technician. 
 
Based on this eight-year commitment plan, the cost of $3,100.00 is a small price 
to pay for developing and maintaining each subject matter expert within the HMRT in a 
fire department that has an operating budget just north of $200 million, according to the 
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annual adopted budget for the city of Dallas 2009–2010 (City of Dallas, 2006).  There is 
no additional cost in developing subject matter experts within the HMRT when the 
hazardous materials technician does not promote.   
The current DFR policy only requires a 30-month commitment once a hazardous 
materials technician is assigned to the HMRT.  In this case, DFR is losing $5,913.00 for 
every hazardous materials technician that leaves the team after the 30-month commitment 
is satisfied, plus the $8,600.00 cost incurred to train a replacement hazardous materials 
technician.  The current DFR plan is not cost effective by any measure and poses no 
opportunity for developing subject matter experts.  The department is unable to recover 
the total value of the cost for training the hazardous materials technician in the 30-month 
time-frame just when they are beginning the intermediate stage of becoming a subject 
matter expert. 
B. VALUE INNOVATION FOR DFR URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE TEAM 
(US&R) 
The value innovation for firefighters serving in the capacity of basic firefighters 
and technical rescuers is advancing members’ effectiveness and efficiency by 
strengthening their knowledge, skills, and abilities in fire and non-fire suppression 
incidents.  Having the experience of performing search and rescue operations during 
structure fires bleeds over into technical rescue tactics.  Rescuers must locate their victim 
before the rescue can be executed then depending on the situation, extent of the 
circumstances, and juncture for critical decision making, decide how to consummate the 
rescue.  As stated by Norman, ―Firefighters can do it both ways‖ fire or no fire (2009, p. 
4).  It is also cost effective for the department when firefighters can serve dual function 
roles and use their advanced training and capabilities during any incident for which they 
are dispatched. 
Rank-specific organization reform in the DFR Urban Search & Rescue Team can 




Materials Response Team.  The cost to DFR for training one Urban Search & Rescue 
member is found in Chapter III, Table 13 and will be rounded to $26,000.00 for this 
illustration.  See Table 32. 
Table 32.   Cost Value to DFR for retaining Urban Search & Rescue Members on the 
Urban Search & Rescue Team 
Cost Value to DFR for retaining Urban Search & Rescue Members  






































Acknowledging the rank-specific staffing structure of DFR, the importance of 
developing subject matter experts within the US&R Team, even if the member makes 
promotion and the department attaining a cost value will be examined in the following 
demonstration.  For this example, assume four US&R Team members promote out of the 
US&R Team after serving only four years.  The cost to replace four US&R members is 
$104,000.00 ($26,000.00 x 4).  The immediate loss to the department because four 
members left the team after serving only four years of an eight-year commitment is 
$52,000.00 ($13,000.00 x 4).  A crux to be made here about training US&R members is 
the timeframe for training personnel in all five technical disciplines may take up to two 
years due to class availability and department scheduling issues. 
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Following the current City of Dallas Uniform Fire Salary Schedule and the 
previous explanation of a borrowed fire driver engineer position, figuring temporary 
assignment pay (TAP), the annual cost to retain one promoted US&R Team member 
within the US&R Team is calculated in Table 33.  The cost comparison for retaining 
subject matter experts versus training four new US&R members is presented in Table 34. 
Table 33.   Annual Cost to DFR (Promotion Pay and TAP) to Retain One Promoted 
Urban Search & Rescue Member within the Urban Search & Rescue Team 
Annual Cost to DFR (Promotion Pay and TAP) to Retain One 
Promoted US&R Member within the US&R Team 
 
 
Annual cost of promotion pay for one 





Annual cost of Temporary Assignment Pay 
(TAP) for borrowed position 
 
$1,000.00 
Total Annual Cost (Promotion Pay and 






Total annual cost to retain one US&R member on the US&R Team to satisfy the 
remaining four years of the eight-year commitment is $16,000.00  
($4,000.00 x 4)  
 
Table 34.   Cost to Retain Four Promoted Urban Search & Rescue Members vs. Cost 
to Train Four New Urban Search & Rescue Members 
Cost to Retain Four Promoted US&R Members vs. Cost to Train Four 
New US&R Members 
(Based on a US&R Member’s initial eight-year commitment to the US&R Team once 
they are assigned) 
 
Cost to retain four promoted US&R 
members for the remaining four years of 
their eight-year commitment [from table 32 
($16,000 x 4)]  
 
$64,000.00 
Cost to train four new US&R members to 
replace the four that promoted out of the 
team 




Cost to Retain Four Promoted US&R Members vs. Cost to Train Four 
New US&R Members 
(Based on a US&R Member’s initial eight-year commitment to the US&R Team once 
they are assigned) 
 
 Cost value of four US&R members lost due 
to promotion and removal from the US&R 
Team serving only four years of an eight-
year commitment 
[cost of years 5–8 from table 31] 
$52,000.00 
 Total cost to DFR for removing four 
US&R members and training four new 
US&R members 
($104,000.00 + $52,000.00) 
$156,000.00 
 
It is extremely cost effective for DFR to retain the four US&R members and develop 
Subject Matter Experts (SME) for the remaining four years of the eight-year commitment 
because the initial cost to train four new US&R members exceeds the cost to retain the 
members by $40,000.00. 
 
There is no extra cost to the department for retaining promoted US&R subject matter 
experts.  
  
Based on this eight-year commitment plan, there is no additional cost to the 
department for developing subject matter experts within the US&R Team.  The current 
DFR policy requires a five-year commitment once a US&R Team member is assigned to 
the US&R Team.  The department is losing $9,750.00 for each US&R member that is 
removed from the US&R Team after only five years of service, plus, the $26,000.00 
incurred cost to train a new US&R member. 
C. VALUE INNOVATION FOR DFR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 
(EOD) TEAM 
The vision for the EOD Team is creating a dedicated full-time EOD Team staffed 
with subject matter experts (SME) by abolishing the current mandatory officer rank 
requirement.  The value innovation of this reorganization will save lives and property 
while reducing high-profile on-scene time. 
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Analysis indicates that the case for restructuring and creating a dedicated full-time 
EOD Team is a result of an untenable vision and insufficient plan.  The current plan 
Dallas Fire-Rescue has developed for the EOD Team (arson investigator/bomb 
technician) is unattainable for developing subject matter experts in either field.  Merging 
career paths of fire arson investigators, police officers, bomb technicians, and hazardous 
materials technicians creates an exorbitant amount of mandatory continuing education 
hours annually that is impossible to achieve on a 24/72 schedule (24 hours on-duty and 
72 hours off-duty) as validated in Chapter V of this thesis.  (Hazardous materials 
technician is included above because it is a required prerequisite for bomb technician 
training and the annual mandatory continuing education hours must be included). 
According to a DFR 2009 Departmental Memorandum # 80, dated October 15, 
2009, the only members eligible to apply for the DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Team are candidates from the fire prevention series and individuals that currently hold 
the rank of lieutenant, captain, or section chief.  This directly excludes Emergency 
Operations Bureau firefighters, as well as any ex-military trained EOD personnel serving 
as firefighters on the department.   
The bomb squad transition plan DFR blueprinted in 2009 Departmental 
Memorandum #34 (described in Chapter IV) can be revolutionized immediately and all 
further expenses amended through a complete metamorphosis.  The plan prescribed 
below is more suitable for the department budget-wise in recovering the cost value of 
training the cardinal amount of bomb technicians and developing career subject matter 
experts. 
Plan for Reorganizing DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team includes: 
 Dedicated full-time EOD Team that functions as bomb technicians only.  
 Bomb technicians’ annual mandatory continuing education hours decrease 
to a more manageable 242 hours.  
 Maintain a 40-hour work week and schedule duty rosters for EOD 
response afterhours, weekends, and holidays.  
 Staff the team with six to seven certified bomb technicians (this allows for 
constantly mentoring approximately two bomb technicians). 
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 Abolish any rank-specific requirement for the EOD Team and move to 
select volunteers with experience or the knowledge, skills, and abilities for 
excelling as a bomb technician. 
 Assign two arson investigators as the primary case investigators for 
assisting the EOD Team on explosive/bomb incidents. 
 The Senior Bomb Technician is the commander on all EOD incidents. 
 Automatically dispatch DFR Hazardous Materials Team with all EOD 
responses for complement/support. 
 Automatically dispatch a medical surveillance team (A Rescue staffed 
with two paramedics) to stand-by for medical assistance while the bomb 
technician is in the hot zone. 
 Automatically dispatch Dallas Police SWAT team to complement/support 
the EOD Team on predefined incidents 
 Transfer the EOD Team to the Emergency Response Bureau 
 Relocate the EOD Team, emergency response apparatus and equipment to 
a secure location (i.e., fire station).   
 Require a minimum eight-year initial commitment when bomb technicians 
are assigned to the EOD Team 
The EOD Team reorganizational plan above expunges the rank-specific 
requirement along with all efforts to combine exorbitant career paths, and reduces the 
overall number of bomb technicians for developing and retaining subject matter experts.  
The cost value for retaining bomb technicians within the EOD Team for eight-year 
commitment is listed in Table 35.  
Table 35.   Cost Value to DFR for Retaining Bomb Technicians on the Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal Team as Bomb Technicians Only 
Cost Value to DFR for Retaining Bomb Technicians on the Explosive Ordnance 



















Cost Value to DFR for Retaining Bomb Technicians on the Explosive Ordnance 























As illustrated in Chapter IV, the current DFR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team 
is staffed with four Dallas police officers who have been transferred to the fire 
department.  In essence DFR added four full-time employees (FTE) to their staffing 
chart.  This is the opportune time to make the conversion to the new proposed plan and 
budget for the additional two to three bomb technicians.  The passage taken below from 
Bomb Squad A Year Inside the Nation’s Most Exclusive Police Unit characterizes, as well 
as justifies, the importance of subject matter experts performing the ―rank-less‖ duties of 
a bomb technician (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007). 
In their way of thinking they are last responders—the last line of defense 
before an explosion occurs and the ambulance teams, doctors, aid workers, 
and morgue attendants have to be brought in.  Their mission requires them 
to confront an unknown and lethal enemy. 
Think of it this way: 
When an X-ray technician takes a picture and a doctor interprets it, they 
are studying a light-and dark-gray transparency in a climate-controlled 
room.  It is a picture of a part of the human body each has seen thousands 
of times before.  When a bomb technician takes a picture of a bomb, he is 
taking it lying on his stomach in the middle of a street and peering through 
his own sweat.  When he gets up to his knees, stands, and then waddles 
back to his partner to interpret it, what they study is an image of 
something that neither of them has seen before.  The bomb tech faces a 
unique challenge; his interpretation of the gray tones of an X-ray is the 
first interpretation of them. 
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This is the key reason why rank carries very little weight in the field.  The 
technician’s life depends on the technician’s interpretation.  Nothing more 
and nothing less. (Esposito & Gerstein, 2007, p. 11) 
Rank-specific organizational reform will certainly challenge the long-held 
traditions of Dallas Fire-Rescue and the development of special operations teams that are 
necessary for completing extraordinary missions, utilizing unconventional methods.  For 
those that continue to resist change and refuse to accept the mission of the fire service has 
changed, this author’s message is: 
We cannot expect to change our long-held traditions, to reorganize our 
army and to create great cities without internal opposition.  Among you 
chieftains and Huns will be those whose spirits cling to our past ways.  We 
will show patience with you unenlightened ones.  Yet, if you choose not 
our new course and cause dissention, you will be stricken from our ranks. 
(Roberts, 1985, p. 94) 
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